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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

The SIXTH EDITION,
With ADDITIONS.

[Price Two Shillings].

DUPLICATE

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN WILKIE, at the Bible, in St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1761.

BODLEIAN

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author of theſe Conſiderations having ventured to differ from the commonly received opinion, it may be of uſe to confirm his ſentiments with the higheſt and moſt unexceptionable authority; that of his Pruſſian Majeſty, who, in a writing, ſaid to have been drawn up by himſelf, ſpeaks in the following manner:

" AS no German prince has a right to meddle with the internal policy of Great Britain, nor with the conſtitution of its government; I have ſome reaſons to hope, that the Engliſh nation will not meddle with the domeſtic affairs of the Empire—And I entertain thoſe hopes the more, becauſe England has no reaſon to meddle with this quarrel from any conſideration of its commerce, or otherwiſe. And although it had a greater inclination for

one German court than for another, yet I think it too unreaſonable to pretend, that ſuch powerful and reſpectable princes, as thoſe of the Empire are, ſhould be obliged to rule their conduct upon the inclinations of thoſe amongſt the Engliſh, who ſtrive to make their countrymen enter into foreign quarrels, that are of no manner of concern to England."

Reſcript to a manifeſto of his Pruſſian Majeſty, delivered and printed at the ſame time, by his Miniſter at London, in the year 1744.

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

THE writer of theſe ſheets does not pretend to more knowledge or better intelligence than other perſons: he propoſes only to offer to the publick the calm diſpaſſionate reflections of a private man, upon the preſent ſtate of our affairs, and the method we have lately choſen of carrying on the war: reflections, which appear to him to be juſt, and which therefore he ſuppoſes may approve themſelves to the underſtandings of others his fellow ſubjects, who ſhall read as he intends to write, without any view to particular men; but to contribute that little he is capable of to the public ſervice. If his obſervations are falſe, they will then be neglected: if they are true and well founded, he is ſure they are of importance enough to deſerve our regard.

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The only war, which England is at this time engaged in, is a war with France. How much ſoever our attention may be diverted, or our affections warped towards this or the other power of Europe, yet that is the only ſtate, with which England is profeſſedly at war. France is its natural rival in time of peace, and its only formidable enemy in time of war. So far are we from having declared war with any other ſtate, that Britain has ſcarce a conteſt ſubſiſting with any other power in Europe. Ruſſia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, the Empire of Germany, and the ſeveral particular ſtates of it, may each of them, at different times, wiſh us well or ill; but Britain has now no oppoſition of intereſt with any of them, and in a general national reſpect has very little to hope or fear from them.

If we take a comparative view of the ſtrength of the two nations, whatever may be ſaid at preſent of our naval force, it muſt be allowed that France is ſuperior to us in its land force. Could we indeed revive the old Gallic conſtitution, which prevailed under the poſterity of Hugh Capet, when France was divided, as Germany is now, among a number of independent princes, who after paying homage to the ſovereign, made war with him, or one another as they pleaſed: or had we the maritime provinces in our own poſſeſſion, or the Dukes of Burgundy and Bretagne for our allies, we might then carry on a war of equality with the crown of France at land, and hope for ſuch victories as thoſe

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of Creſſy, Poictiers, and Agincourt. But from the time when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the States and nobility abſolutely ſubjected to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of its country, the number of its inhabitants, and the greatneſs of its revenue, ſuperior to Britain. The maps will teach us the firſt of theſe; all the writers on political arithmetic agree in the ſecond; and the third we have learned the laſt winter from a gentleman, who, by being the maſter of our own finances, may be allowed to have the beſt knowledge of thoſe of other countries: and whoſe argument did not at all diſpoſe him to magnify the French Revenue.

France is ſtronger at land, not only than England, but than any other power in Europe. The Empire of Germany, in the extent of its country, and the number of its inhabitants may be equal, if not ſuperior to France; but the diviſion of it into a great number of ſeparate independent States, while France has its whole force united under one abſolute monarch, renders Germany greatly inferior to France. Hence it is, that France has for a century paſt been formidable to the reſt of Europe; and has twice been able to ſupport a long war againſt the united alliance of the whole.

Whenever any power in Europe ſhall have grown up to a degree of ſtrength, much greater than that of any other power; it from thenceforward becomes

the intereſt of the other States, to be watchful over it, to guard againſt the growth of it, and mutually to aſſiſt each other, when they are attacked by it. This is the univerſal maxim of politics, which has held good in all ages, from the firſt eſtabliſhing of governments. *Dum ſinguli pugnant, univerſi vincuntur*, is related by the hiſtorian as a cauſe of the extending the Roman monarchy; and muſt be a principal, or at leaſt a concomitant cauſe, in the growth of every other.

It was from this principle, that France and the reſt of Europe were jealous of Charles the Vth, when Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, with the Indies, were united under one head. "*And all true* "*Engliſhmen, ſince the decay of the Spaniſh monarchy,* "*have ever taken it for granted, that the ſecurity of* "*their religion, liberty, and property; that their ho-* "*nour, their wealth, and their trade depend chiefly* "*upon the proper meaſures to be taken from time to* "*time againſt the growing power of France.*" This was the language of parliament in their addreſs to King William juſt before his death; and of that Houſe of Commons, which has been thought his wiſeſt, and to have beſt conſulted the nation's intereſt.

The three powers of Europe, which are moſt indanger'd by France, and which by their union alone can carry on an effectual land war againſt France, are Germany, Holland, and England: Spain, and Savoy, Ruſſia, Denmark, and Sweden, may any of them accede to ſuch an alliance; but Germany,

Holland,

Holland, and England, muſt be the baſis of every confederacy, which can be of any avail againſt the land power of France.

I never read the hiſtory of the two grand alliances, which were formed by King William againſt the growing power of France, without feeling the warmeſt ſentiments of gratitude to that great deliverer of Europe. Never did King of England appear with greater dignity, than he did in that grand Congreſs, held at the Hague in the year 1691; when the Emperor and Empire, the Kings of Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their ſeveral ambaſſadors, the Electors of Germany by their particular miniſters, and ſeveral of them in their own perſons, with at leaſt fifty of the greateſt Princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the cauſe of Europe; and all joined in one common league and declaration againſt France. This was an auguſt alliance worthy of a King of England to fight at the head of. An alliance which brought down Two hundred thouſand men upon the French frontiers, beſide thoſe in Britiſh pay *. And tho' King William was not the moſt ſucceſsful war-

* Lewis XIVth had generally five armies in the courſe of this war; ſometimes ſix, and never leſs than four. Thoſe in Germany and Flanders often amounted to 100,000 ſoldiers; beſide garriſons kept in the frontier towns. The French monarch had at one time, including his land and naval forces, 450,000 men in pay. Neither the Turkiſh Empire, nor the Roman, had ever ſo many wars at once to ſupport.

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rior, yet the weight of this alliance broke the power of the French, and made them ſue for the peace of Ryſwick. And the good faith which was obſerved in the conducting that treaty, and the equal regard which was paid to all the Princes concerned, gave ſo general a ſatisfaction, as to lay a firm foundation of confidence in the honor of the Engliſh government; and enabled King William to form a ſecond like alliance, when the death of the King of Spain, and the ſeizure of that whole monarchy for the grandſon of France, made it neceſſary.

France, in conſequence of that firſt alliance, beheld five armies of 50,000 men each upon its frontiers, three of them commanded by the Electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburgh, not fighting with one another for the French diverſion, but invading of France upon the Rhine, beſides the grand army of the Empire under the Duke of Lorrain, and the united force of England and Holland in Flanders. And, though the ſtrength of France was at length exhauſted by contending with the troops of all Europe; yet the long oppoſition, which it made to the united efforts of Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Savoy, Spain, Holland, and England, proves the immenſe height of power which that kingdom may arrive at, and the abſolute neceſſity there was of forming ſuch an union.

We have ſince heard ſo much of the attempts of France towards an univerſal monarchy, and of the bal-

ballance of power, neceſſary to be preſerved in oppoſition to it; and have ſeen it made a pretence for ſo many meaner purpoſes; that we now nauſeate the ſubject, and do not like to hear any more of it. Yet a meaſure which was once right, muſt continue to have been right to eternity. And though France may not at preſent have a Prince, equally able and enterprizing with Lewis the XIVth, yet the kingdom is the ſame, and its land forces are ſtill formidable to Europe: at leaſt, it is the only State which either Europe in general, or England in particular, can be indangered by; and the only State, which England is now at war with.

Every meaſure, which has a tendency to the uniting the powers of Europe among themſelves and againſt France, muſt therefore be for the general good of Europe, and the particular intereſt of England: and every meaſure, which tends to ſet the States of Germany, Holland, and England, either at war with each other, or amongſt themſelves, muſt be a meaſure calculated for the good of France, and the prejudice of the other powers of Europe. For the ſame reaſon, every meaſure, tending to the continuance or increaſe of ſuch a war, muſt be for the benefit of France, and the prejudice of Europe; becauſe it is a weakening of the rivals of France; and keeping thoſe powers at variance, from whom France can have nothing to fear, but in their union.

Ever ſince the times immediately preceding the treaty of Weſtphalia, it has been the conſtant aim

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of the French government to eſtabliſh an equality of power and independence among a number of princes in Germany, and to keep them as much as poſſible divided from each other, both in intereſt and in religion. The crown of Sweden, and the Proteſtant States of the Empire, had for many years preceding that treaty, been indangered by the power of the Houſe of Auſtria: and therefore, when Guſtavus Adolphus declared war againſt it, France, to ſerve its own purpoſes, willingly entered into alliances with him, and his ſucceeding generals, thro' the whole courſe of the war: and the Cardinals Richlieu and Mazarine, while they were perſecuting it in France, became the Defenders of the Proteſtant Faith in Germany. This independency of the ſeveral German States, which was ſo firmly eſtabliſhed by the treaty of Weſtphalia, is what the German Princes call the Liberties of Germany, the conſtitution of the Empire, and the Syſtem of Germany. And the French willingly guarantied this treaty; knowing, that while they kept Germany thus divided, they themſelves ſhould be the leſs indangered by it *.

* The guarding againſt any events, which *may ſhake the conſtitution, or overturn the Syſtem of the Empire*, or in other words the preſerving their own independence, may be a proper object of concern to the ſeveral German Princes in their own German diet: but the intereſt of Britain, and the peace of Europe, had always led us to wiſh rather to ſee ſome one great power eſtabliſhed in Germany, which ſhould be the natural rival of, and balance againſt the power of France.

If every war between England and Holland, or between either of theſe and Germany, or in Germany itſelf, between any two States of the Empire, be, ſo far as it goes, a prejudice to Europe, and a ſecurity to France; it follows, that whenever ſuch wars ſhall ariſe between any two German States, and much more between any two principal powers of Europe, it will be the policy of France to encourage and inflame them. Thus the French court, in Charles the IId's time, encouraged the Dutch to undertake a war with the Engliſh, and afterwards excited the court of England to declare war againſt Holland, promiſing to both the aſſiſtance of their fleet, but leaving them both in battle to deſtroy each other.

On the other hand, whatever wars ſhall ariſe between any two States of Europe, or any two princes of the Empire, it will be the intereſt of every other State, except France, to compoſe theſe differences, if it can be done, by their mediation and good offices.

If every war, which ariſes between any two particular States of the Empire, be itſelf a misfortune, and contrary to the intereſt of Europe; the evil will be ſtill the greater, and the miſchief ſo much the more extenſive, if France ſhall make itſelf a party in the war, and ſhall join itſelf to either of the two ſides, to keep the diſpute alive ſo much the longer. Accordingly we find that this has been the conſtant

policy

policy of France, to mix itſelf in all quarrels in the Empire, and keep up the diſputes of the contending parties as long as it can; till one or the other is reduced, or they ſhall both ſee their intereſt to agree.

Should England or Holland take the oppoſite part in any ſuch diſpute, this would be a ſtill greater misfortune; and could only ſerve to extend and multiply the evil, and lengthen the continuance of it: and, whoever be the parties, or whatever be the event of the war, muſt be a misfortune to Europe; and ſo long as it continued muſt be a weakening of Germany, and a ſervice to the cauſe of France.

Thus let the whole force of Germany be conſidered as equal to a hundred: and let any two powers of it be at war together, whoſe force ſhall be to each other as eight to ten of thoſe parts. So far as this war goes, it is a loſs to Europe by the deſtruction or diminution of the force of eighteen parts. If the quarrel be adopted by any of the other powers of Germany, that produces a loſs or diminution of ſo many more parts: If France, to keep up the conteſt, ſhould take the weaker ſide, and add to the power whoſe force is eight, ſo as to make it ſuperior to ten, the evil is not leſſened, but made greater. Should England be ſo unfortunate as to join in the conteſt, and ſend its land force of fifty into the war, and France thereupon

upon ſend a force of eighty; the party aſſiſted by England would be but little benefited by the alliance; the Engliſh would ſtill be the weaker ſide; the force of Europe would be diminiſhed ſo much the more, and France only be advantaged. This is a kind of reaſoning which muſt hold invariably juſt in all ages. And whether Britain ſhall take the part of Heſſe againſt Saxe, or of Saxe againſt Heſſe; of Auſtria againſt Pruſſia, or of Pruſſia againſt Auſtria; the intereſt of Europe is hurt, the powers of Germany are weakened, and France only can be aggrandized at the expence of both.

Should the reader think this reaſoning too minute, and make a doubt, whether the cauſe of Europe can be ſo much affected by the diſputes of theſe minor States of the Empire; I am not diſpoſed to augment the importance of them: but then, if the intereſt of Europe be not concerned in them, that of England muſt be much leſs ſo; becauſe no German diſpute can be an object worthy the Britiſh regard, but only as the intereſt of Europe is affected by it. Whether Wittenburgh or Wirtemburgh, Lunenburgh or Lawenburgh, Sulzbach or Anſpatch, ſhall get the better in any diſpute, is an affair, which may engage the paſſions, the prejudices, and ſometimes the intereſt of any particular Elector: but all theſe party quarrels of Germans among themſelves are beneath the notice of the imperial crown of theſe realms. Britain knows none of them, but as members of the Empire in

general, and as parts of one great whole, to be actuated againſt France, the common enemy..

In ſhort, either there is ſuch a thing, as a common intereſt of Europe, and Germany is or may be of uſe to Britain and the common cauſe; or it cannot. If there is no ſuch common cauſe, or Germany cannot be of uſe to it, then certainly it cannot be of uſe for England to laviſh away its millions about it. If there be ſuch a cauſe, and Germany ever can be of uſe to England by ſerving it, it can be only ſo by its union. Germany divided into factions, and fighting the one half of it againſt the other half, cannot weaken France, or ſerve the cauſe of Europe. Nothing but a hearty union of the Emperor and Empire, and the ſeveral States, which compoſe it, acting under one head, can be of any avail for this purpoſe. The ſowing diviſions, therefore, in the Empire, and abetting the quarrels between any of its members, may ſerve the humour of a particular Elector; certainly does ſerve the cauſe of France, but never can the intereſt of England.

I don't determine, whether the Germans are likely ſoon to agree together in any one point; and much leſs in uniting with England and the States General in a war with France: but till they do thus agree, England has nothing to do with their little internal quarrels. The only chance we have however for ſuch an union, and the only means of accelerating it,

it, is to leave the French to themſelves ; not to conquer Germany, for that is impoſſible ; but to harraſs it as much as they pleaſe, and make themſelves as odious as we can deſire.

If a regard for the intereſt of Europe in general ought to keep us from meddling in any German domeſtic war, the particular intereſt of Germany will be no leſs hurt by our engaging in it. One of the greateſt calamities which can happen to a country, is doubtleſs that of a civil war. A war between two members of the Empire is in reſpect to that head, under which they are all united, a civil war. There may be a difference in the degree of obedience, due from the ſeveral States to the head of the Empire, and that of the ſubjects of any particular kingdom to theirs; but ſo far as the intereſt of the Empire is affected, and ſo far as the preſent argument is concerned, this is a German civil war. One of the moſt miſchievous circumſtances attending civil wars has generally been, that each ſide, being more animated by their party hatred, than by the love of their country, the weaker is too apt to call in a foreign force to its aſſiſtance. Theſe always enter to ſerve their own purpoſes, and not that of the country in general, or of the particular party which invites them. This begets a precedent, and excites the other party to adopt the ſame deſtructive meaſure. Thus the State is over-run with armies much greater than its own ; and every part of the country ravaged, to the de-

ſtruction of the individuals; till at length perhaps the war terminates in an iſſue, very different from what either of the parties had originally intended. Every one knows, that this is the general hiſtory of civil wars. Place the ſcene where you will, or in what age of the world you think fit, this has been the common courſe of them. Our own country indeed was fortunate enough, to have all the powers of Europe ſo much employ'd againſt each other, during the period of our civil war, that they had no leiſure to attend to the Engliſh concerns. Tho' France did us the kind office of ſending a miniſter, under the pretence of a mediator, to inflame our differences, and blow them up into a civil war as ſoon as it could; but its troops were otherwiſe employ'd.

Germany has been ſo unhappy, as to have a diſpute ariſe between two of its leading princes about the right to four great duchies in one of its remoteſt provinces. What the names of theſe are, I confeſs I do not know; nor I ſuppoſe does one man in ten thouſand of my fellow ſubjects; though we have ſpent ſo many millions about them: but they lie ſomewhere in Sileſia, one of the moſt eaſtern inland provinces of Germany, with twenty intermediate States between us and them. Such a diſpute ariſing in Germany was doubtleſs a misfortune to it. However, as the revenues of neither of the parties are inexhauſtible, the probable iſſue of ſuch a war, if they were left to themſelves, would be,

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that one or the other of them would find their revenues brought to an end, and would be obliged to ſubmit. Whether Pruſſia or Auſtria carried its point, cannot be a matter of the leaſt conſequence to England: for, beſide that the country itſelf is at too great a diſtance for us to be affected by it; England has actually taken both ſides of the controverſy, and therefore cannot be really intereſted in either. But the misfortunes of Germany are not ſo ſpeedily terminated. Unhappily for the poor people, the one ſide called in the French, and the other the Engliſh. Can this be for the intereſt of Germany, to have the flame of a civil war fed with a ſtock of fuel infinitely greater than its own? To have the revenues of England and France poured into the Empire, ſo much the longer to enable the Germans to deſtroy each other, and multiply the miſeries of this civil war through all the parts of the Empire?

But it may be ſaid perhaps, that, *if Britain does not take any part in theſe German wars, France nevertheleſs will: and therefore England's interfering is only a neceſſary oppoſition to France.* How far this may be right in reſpect of England, ſhall be conſidered hereafter; but we are now treating of it only in relation to the intereſt of Germany. Doubtleſs then it is the intereſt of France, as often as any of the German princes go to war, to aſſiſt the weaker party, and blow up the contention. This the French may practiſe by themſelves, to a cer-

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tain degree, and for a certain time; till the Germans ſhall ſee their own intereſt, and the French ſhall make themſelves odious. But if, as often as France declares on one ſide, England adopts the other, how is Germany relieved? France will always take care to ſend troops enough to keep the balance even; and all that England can do by its officiouſneſs, will be the drawing ſo many more parts of Germany into the quarrel, and enabling the Germans to cut each others throats ſo much the longer. That is, leave the French to themſelves, they will doubtleſs do as much miſchief as they can; but in time they may make themſelves generally hated, and the Germans wiſe enough to agree: and England, ſo long as it continues neuter, will be courted by both parties, and by its good offices may mediate a peace between them: but the hope of peace vaniſhes, the inſtant we declare for either of the parties; which are thereby ſet the farther at variance. That is, we double the calamity to Germany, and divide with France the odium of it.

But if the French are left to themſelves in Germany, this will increaſe their influence in the ſeveral courts of it. For a time it may; but Britain cannot help that. So long as the contending parties are exaſperated againſt each other, England by eſpouſing the cauſe of either, cannot probably benefit the ſide it adopts; certainly cannot benefit itſelf, and only makes the influence of France over the other ſide ſo much the ſtronger.

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Would we then have all Germany be over-run by the French? I anſwer, No. Humanity teaches us to wiſh hurt to no country; but Germany is not *ours*. If the French will ſtir up diviſions among the German princes, and they are weak enough to yield to them, is England anſwerable for this? If any country in Europe is to be over-run by the French, whither can their armies (eſpecially when we are at war with them) be better turned, than into Germany? A country which they never can conquer, which can beſt bear their invaſions, and the powers of which are by themſelves able, when united, to repel them. If Germans themſelves have ſo little affection for Germany, as to call in foreign troops to oppreſs it, are we bound to feel a greater concern for their country than they? Is Britain to make itſelf the general Knight-Errant of Europe, to reſcue oppreſſed States; and exhauſt itſelf, and neglect its own wars, in order to ſave men in ſpite of themſelves, and who will not do any thing towards their own deliverance?

But ſhall we ſuffer the Proteſtant intereſt to be oppreſſed? This is a queſtion put into the mouths of many good people, and therefore deſerves a particular anſwer. We happen now to have one nominal Proteſtant Prince on our ſide; and therefore the Proteſtant intereſt has been ſpeciouſly held out to our view. But in the laſt war we were fighting for the Queen of Hungary; and this Proteſtant Prince had only a Popiſh King of France for his defender. Did we think the Proteſtant intereſt at all

all concerned in that war? And why ſhould we in this? This great champion of Proteſtantiſm was then univerſally decried by us, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle. Have his writings made us think better of his religion? We ſet out even in this war with conſidering him as an enemy to our Proteſtant Electorate; and hired an army of Ruſſians to invade him. What is it then which has at once changed him in our opinion, from a deſpiſer of all religion, to the defender of the Proteſtant? But not to inſiſt on this,

In the firſt place, if we recollect the ſtate of Europe at the time of the breaking out of the preſent war, what one Popiſh power had attacked the Proteſtant religion, or had ſhewn the leaſt intention to infringe the liberties of any one Proteſtant State? Something of that ſort might have happened before; but at that time there was not a Palatine or a Saltzburgher complaining. Even that moſt bigotted Houſe of Auſtria was then practiſing leſs of its religious tyranny over its Proteſtant ſubjects, than it had been ordinarily uſed to. Not one innovation had been made in the Empire, in prejudice of the Proteſtant intereſt, except only that the King of Pruſſia had built a Popiſh church at Berlin, for the introduction of that religion into the midſt of his Proteſtant Dominions; and had the foundation-ſtone laid in his own name; for which the Pope wrote him a Letter of thanks. Should the Proteſtants of Germany therefore, at ſuch a time, have pretended, that their religion was

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in danger, and that they took up arms for the defence of it, the Papiſts might very juſtly conclude, that they never will lay them down again ; for there never was a time, when the Proteſtants had leſs ground of complaint, than at the commencement of this war. How then can this be called a religious war ? The truth is, ſuch an aſſertion might paſs in an Engliſh aſſembly, willing to believe any thing that was ſaid to it. They might be told, that the Empreſs Queen was going to deſtroy the Proteſtant religion, and the *ſyſtem of the Empire* ; but no one of the Proteſtant powers upon the Continent was under the leaſt apprehenſion of danger to their religion, at that time, from the Houſe of Auſtria, whatever may have been their jealouſies from the King of Pruſſia.

Should any one doubt of this, let him in the next place conſider, who are the parties which are engaged in this war. If we look round Europe, we ſhall find as many Proteſtant States fighting againſt us, as for us ; and more, who rather wiſh ill, than wiſh well, to our cauſe, which therefore they certainly do not think the cauſe of Proteſtantiſm. Swedes and Saxons are in arms againſt us ; the Ruſſians, though not Proteſtants, are ſtill farther from being Papiſts ; and the Dutch and Danes have given no proof of their wiſhing ſucceſs to our cauſe. I do not mean the defence of Hanover, but the war, in which we are ſupporting the King of Pruſſia. Does any one think, that the

French attack the Hanoverians, becauſe they are Proteſtants? Or that the end of their ſending their armies thither is to convert them to Popery? Did they make the leaſt attempt of that ſort, while they were in poſſeſſion of the country? Surely then we may allow the other Proteſtant States of Europe to be judges of the intereſt of their religion, as well as ourſelves: and not one of theſe have expreſſed the leaſt apprehenſions of danger threatened to it. We may, if we pleaſe, hardily call this King of Pruſſia the defender of the Proteſtants; but no one Proteſtant power in Europe will thank us for what he has done; nor will any German Proteſtant State act with us, except only thoſe, which we have bought, and taken into our pay.

In the laſt place, let us conſider the operations of this war, and what are the effects, which it has actually produced; which in every other caſe is allowed to be the beſt rule to form a judgment upon. The very firſt concerted operation of this Proteſtant champion, in which an Engliſh miniſter accompanied him, while the Electoral miniſter at Ratiſbon diſowned him, was the entering into, and ſeizing of Saxony, the firſt Proteſtant State of the Empire; and ſetting all the Proteſtant States at variance with each other.

The reader will remember, that we are not now conſidering, whether this Pruſſian war was a juſt one; but how far it is a religious one. Whether Pruſſia or Saxony be in the right, the hurt done to the

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Proteſtant intereſt in Germany, by ſetting two Proteſtant Electors at variance, is juſt the ſame; and the Popiſh States alone can rejoice in the deſtruction of either. There have been times, when the zeal of the Popes of Rome made them hold frequent conſiſtories to conſult, how they might beſt deſtroy that peſtilent northern hereſy, as our religion was once called, when the reformation was firſt adopted by the northern powers of Germany; and there have been bigotted Emperors, who have formed leagues, and made many attempts, in conjunction with the court of Rome, for the deſtruction of Proteſtants; which Providence was pleaſed to diſappoint. But what is there which the bittereſt enemies of our religion could have deviſed, ſo effectually to ſerve their purpoſe, as the lighting up a war between theſe Proteſtant States themſelves? Which, without raiſing any jealouſy of Papiſts; without the cruelty of perſecution; without the odium of incurring any breach of faith, ſhould ſet theſe Proteſtant powers upon worrying each other, with infinitely greater deſtruction than any the ſharpeſt perſecution ever produced, and ruining the whole north of Germany.

Could a Gregory or a Ferdinand have wiſhed for any thing more, than that Saxony, where the reformation firſt began, ſhould be ravaged from end to end: its country waſted, its cities ruined, their ſuburbs burnt, its princes and nobles driven into baniſhment, its merchants beggared, its peaſants

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forced into arms, and made to ſheath their ſwords in the bowels of their countrymen, or in thoſe of their Proteſtant neighbours, Bohemians, Hungarians, or Sileſians; or elſe forced to fly for ſhelter into the armies of France, there to fight under Popiſh banners, againſt their Proteſtant brethren, and made to march over the bodies of Proteſtant Britons *.

Could the cooleſt malice of jeſuitiſm have doomed our Faith to a heavier vengeance, than to have Proteſtant Saxons ſtabbing Proteſtant Britons, Proteſtant Hanoverians murdering Proteſtant Wirtenburghers, Proteſtant Heſſians fighting againſt Proteſtant Palatines, Proteſtant Swedes invading Proteſtant Pruſſians, and Proteſtant Bohemians, Hungarians, and Sileſians, coming all armed, under Popiſh ſtandards, to cut the throats of Proteſtant Brandenburghers. All this, and more have we ſeen (eventually, though not intentionally) brought about by the councils of Proteſtants themſelves, and have in one year given more money to effect it, than the amount of all the ſums, which the court of Rome has contributed for the deſtruction

* The troops, which marched over general Kingſley at the battle of Minden, and which muſt have been firſt cut to pieces, if our horſe had come up, were Saxon infantry. The regiments, which the French oppoſed to Prince Ferdinand's attack at Bergen, were Saxons; and throughout the war, the German corps in the French army, have been made the greateſt ſufferers.

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of Proteſtantiſm, from the birth of Luther, to this day.

But ſhall France be ſuffered to conquer Hanover? No one, who is in the leaſt acquainted with the State of Europe, and the conſtitution of the Empire, can ſuppoſe that the crown of France ſhould entertain a thought of making a real and permanent conqueſt of Hanover. France enters Germany as a friend and ally of the Empire, and as guarantee of the treaty of Weſtphalia; and as ſuch cannot pretend to make a real conqueſt there; that would be quarrelling with its allies in the very act of aſſiſting them. An Electorate of the Empire is not to be annihilated, but by the deſtruction of the whole Germanic conſtitution. For a King of France to make himſelf Elector of Hanover, and eject a whole family out of its rights, would be ſo great an act of violence, that every member in the empire would riſe againſt it. Sweden and Denmark could not but take the alarm at it. And if France were to pretend to hold the Electorate in its own right, what muſt become of the intermediate States? Would the French conquer them too? That muſt commit them in eternal quarrels with every member of the Germanic body. Would the Empire ſuffer a great part of Germany, and two or three Electorates at once to be cut off from its dominions, and made a part of the kingdom of France? 'Tis the very thing which England ſhould wiſh the French to attempt, in order to unite all Germany againſt them.

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Would they then hold the Electorate by itſelf, detached from all their other dominions? Hanover in that caſe, might prove the church-yard of the French, as well as Italy has been, and the other parts of Germany. Nor would England have any reaſon to envy France, the impracticable taſk of defending a country, ſurrounded with enemies, and ſeparated from all its other dominions. But in reality, the conſtitution of Europe, makes every thing of this kind abſolutely impoſſible. All that France can propoſe, after the greateſt ſucceſs there, can be only to take a temporary poſſeſſion of the country during the war; to hold it in depoſite, as the King of Pruſſia did the Electorate of Saxony. And, if this were to happen, doubtleſs every good man ought to be ſorry for it: but wherein conſiſts that ſuperlative greatneſs of the evil, that Britain ſhould thus move Heaven and Earth, and riſk every danger to prevent it. The French, 'tis true, would poſſeſs themſelves of the revenues of the country, and all the taxes, which the people now pay to their ſovereign, would be paid to France. But would England be ſo much impoveriſhed? Or would the crown of France be ſo very formidably enriched by the acquiſition? A French army, in the country, would themſelves probably find a uſe for all the money they could raiſe there: but ſuppoſe a very diſintereſted general ſhould be able to remit a couple of hundred thouſand pounds from Hanover to Verſailles, which is probably more than the French revenue would ever gain by it; is there

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any kind of œconomy in our having put ourſelves in three years time to an expence of twelve millions, to prevent France from getting ſix hundred thouſand pounds out of Germany?

But the poor people, it may be ſaid, *deſerve our compaſſion*. True, they do ſo; and for that reaſon we ought to let them alone, and not make their country the theatre of a war, which muſt ruin them. A ſmall State, which is invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than itſelf, is doubtleſs under a great misfortune; all reſiſtance is uſeleſs, and it has nothing to do but ſubmit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune; and that is, by having another great State, almoſt equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country ſubmit, it has but one army to maintain; and may in the beginning yield upon terms, which are tolerable: but if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is ſure to be oppreſſed by them both. An army is a many headed monſter, that muſt be fed; and the defending army ought to have as many mouths as the attacking; and each will get but all they can from the poor inhabitants.

We have indeed heard, with concern, of turning a country into a mere deſert. But what was the reaſon? Not becauſe the country was conquered; that is a reaſon for preſerving it; but to prevent the danger of its being loſt.

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The preſent more humanized laws of war, do not admit of burning of towns, and deſtroying of countries, where there is no oppoſition made. " *Before Chriſtianity was eſtabliſhed in the world :* " *when vanquiſhed provinces were laid waſte, and de-* " *populated*, ſays Marſhal Saxe, *the fortifying of* " *great towns might wear ſome appearance of reaſon ;* " *but now that war is carried on with more modera-* " *tion and humanity, as being, by theſe meaſures,* " *productive of more advantage to the conqueror,* " *&c.*" Theſe more violent ravages are only committed in time of actual war, and are ſolely the conſequents of oppoſition. And when two great armies are carrying on a war in a country, each of them will make this deſtruction ; when it happens to be neceſſary for them, to prevent their enemies finding ſubſiſtence in it, or purſuing them through it ; each of them will be apt to do it, without aſking themſelves whether they are the invaders, or the defenders of it.

, The Spaniards burnt their own country in Queen Anne's war ; and, if the French ſhould be able to throw over a body of men into England, while our armies are fighting in Germany, it ought to be done here. I do not ſay whether it would be done or not, but every horſe, cow, and ſheep, ought to be driven off or deſtroyed, and every ſtack, mill, and oven, burned or ruined. Theſe are evils, which are not prevented, but made in

in a country by reſiſtance: they never follow, from its being invaded, but frequently ariſe out of its being defended. Nothing of this kind was practiſed in Hanover, while the French were victorious, and in quiet poſſeſſion of it: they would not deſtroy the country then for their own advantage. But let a ſuperior army come to drive them out, or let a defending army be obliged to abandon it, each will be apt to leave as little as poſſible behind them, to accommodate their enemies in their purſuit. Such are the calamities to which we wilfully expoſe a ſmall State, by making it the ſeat of war, between two potentates much greater than itſelf.

Compaſſionate minds might ſtill entertain a doubt about theſe things, and ſuſpect that there might be ſome unknown evils in a French army's poſſeſſing themſelves of the Electorate, if we had not already tried it. But we have now made the experiment, and know the worſt of it. The French have already been in poſſeſſion of this country. Did the ſun refuſe to ſhine, or the rivers ceaſe to flow, upon that account? They certainly did not here in England. Britain ſtill continued an iſland, and its government ſtill ſubſiſted, though the French had ſeized on the government of Hanover. But the poor people were miſerable. Without doubt they were ſufferers, and deſerved our compaſſion, but poſſibly not to that degree, which may have been repreſented. Inſtead of conſulting our imaginations, or hearkening to exaggerated deſcriptions at a diſtance; there

is a ſurer method of judging, and that is, by conſulting the ſufferers themſelves, and liſtening to the language of their actions. What did they do on that occaſion? The Hanoverian chancery renouncing all their Engliſh connections, made the convention of Cloſter-Seven: by which, they agreed to give the French the poſſeſſion of the country, deſiring to live in a quiet ſtate of neutrality. Happy, if they might have continued ſo: but ſoon after the King of Pruſſia gained the victory of Roſbatch, and he did not think it proper to allow them to remain at peace. His arguments prevailed, and the army of obſervation took up their arms again. The unneceſſarily giving offence, is not the way to do good; and therefore I attempt no farther elucidation on this head. But whatever elſe may be dark in this myſterious tranſaction; one thing at leaſt is clear; that, ſince the Hanoverians by themſelves were content to ſign a neutrality, and let the French ſtay in their country, we need not put ourſelves to the annual expence of four or five millions to keep them out.

Here I may be told, perhaps, of the Duke de Richlieu's extortions, while the French army was in the country; and every benevolent mind will doubtleſs feel a juſt concern for the ſufferings, which the poor people indured; far be it from me to attempt to leſſen them. But the reader will recollect, that theſe oppreſſions were alledged as one of the pleas for the convention of Cloſter-Seven's being broken;

broken; and that therefore ſome allowances are to be made for the aggravations, which are natural upon ſuch an occaſion. And did not this general render himſelf odious by his exceſſes? And did not ſome of his own officers condemn him by a contrary behaviour? Both of theſe therefore prove the truth of what I have ſaid, about the more civilized laws of war: elſe the one could not have been condemned for the breaking them, or the other honoured for obſerving them. But beſide this, it is to be conſidered that the Electorate, by its union with Pruſſia, was become obnoxious to the other Princes of the Empire. They had with indignation ſeen the King of Pruſſia twice ſet all Germany in a flame, ravage ſome of the fineſt parts of the empire, and ſacrifice the lives of his own ſubjects, and theirs, by thouſands, to his ambition; many of them had been actual ſufferers, and all were kept in fear by him. By this conjunction therefore of the Hanoverian cauſe with his, the French gained a ſpecious pretence to gratify their own malice, and their general's rapacity, at the poor Hanoverians coſt; and at the ſame time the merit of ſerving the Empire, and revenging the cauſe of its ſuffering members in ſo doing. The extraordinary part therefore of the ſufferings of the poor people, is not to be placed to the Engliſh account, but to the Pruſſian. Had the Electorate appeared in Germany, in as inoffenſive a light, as the intereſt of England, and the good of the poor people of Hanover ſhould have led us to wiſh, the French might not have ventured on thoſe

exceſſes. But they knew, that none of the other Princes of the Empire would reſent them: that they had then before their eyes much greater ſeverities, practiſing in Saxony *; and therefore, might not be diſpleaſed to ſee a few of the ſame extortions brought home to that Electorate, which they might be apt to think, had been one of the cauſes of them. After all, it muſt be allowed, that ſome officers are more rapacious than others, and the poor Hanoverians had then the misfortune of having the French army commanded by one of the worſt of them. But in general, the French are a fair enemy, and neither they nor we have exerciſed any unneceſſary cruelties to each others ſubjects. Nor could the country therefore have any ſufferings to fear beyond the allowed uſage of war upon an Engliſh account: nor would a French army ſtay there, in all probability, more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the French court all hope of drawing over an Engliſh army to meet them there.

In the courſe of the laſt war, we ſaw French armies traverſe all Germany, and enter into the countries of friends and foes. Their coming into any country, is doubtleſs a bad thing, but we have never known the Germans themſelves conſider it in ſo

* The city of Leipſic was then actually under a ſort of military execution: and the merchants made to draw bills upon their correſpondents, and kept under guard, till their bills were accepted.

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very terrible a light, as to throw away millions after millions to prevent it.

If one French General's conduct prove an exception to the received laws of war, we have every year a very ſtrong evidence to confirm them. The Landgraviate of Heſſe is as fine a country as any in North Germany; and yet their Landgrave lets us have his troops for the ſum of 340,000 l. and ſuffers the French to poſſeſs themſelves every year of his country, and come into his capital; his troops being at that very time fighting againſt them in our ſervice. And we, here in England, thought ſo very lightly of their having entered it now the third year; that we made rejoicings for the action of Warbourg, in which we had at moſt killed only 1500 French, and taken as many priſoners, and fired the Tower guns for it, as a victory gained; though we knew that by that very action, the French had taken poſſeſſion of Caſſel, and the greateſt part of Heſſe. If two ſucceſſive Landgraves have every year expoſed their country, and their own palace to be poſſeſſed by the French, for the benefit of letting us their troops for 340,000 l. then, though we cannot poſitively aſcertain the damage, this gives us at leaſt a negative meaſure of it; and proves, that it cannot exceed that ſum.

The reader will obſerve, that I give every advantage to this eſtimate, and ſuppoſe them to ſet the lives of their ſoldiers at nothing. However, if

if the Landgrave did not repent, and we fired guns of rejoicing, at the time when the French army got poſſeſſion of Caſſel; can their getting one ſtep farther appear ſo very tremendous a thing, that this nation ſhould ſpend, three, four, and five, millions to prevent it?

But Hanover is now attacked ſolely upon an Engliſh account; and therefore England ought to defend it. Certain it is, that the Electorate is invaded merely on an Engliſh account.---And will not this always be the caſe? Is it poſſible for that country to give our enemies leſs ground of offence in any future quarrel, than it did in this? Could the French pretend to ſay, that the Electorate had taken any part in the diſpute between the two nations about our poſſeſſions in America? Who does not ſee then, that the ſingle reaſon, why it is attacked, is becauſe the French know that we ſhall defend it? That the French therefore only march their troops thither; becauſe, as we, by our ſuperiority at ſea, have the advantage in attacking the French ſettlements in America, and the Eaſt and Weſt Indies; ſo the French, by their ſuperiority at land, and their greater nearneſs to Hanover, are ſure to have the advantage, by meeting the Engliſh troops there.

They would not go thither, unleſs they were certain of finding us there: they always will go thither, as long as the Engliſh councils reſolve to oppoſe them there. The reaſon is, that it is not worth their while to march their troops ſo far from

from home, from any other motive but that. I would not be underſtood to depreciate the Electorate, or to ſet the value of it below that of other countries: but no particular diſtrict in North Germany, is rich enough to make it worth the while of a great kingdom, like that of France, to march its troops ſo far out of its own dominions merely for the ſake of maintaining them at free quarter. One German Prince may treat another in that manner; as for inſtance, when this war ſhall be concluded, the Elector of Saxony may perhaps chooſe to go and eat up another Electorate by way of retaliation for our having, as he may think, ſo largely contributed to the deſtruction of Saxony. He, as a German, may have his German paſſions, prejudices, or affections; and one German power may attack another, without giving umbrage to the Empire: but to a great King, like the King of France, it cannot be an object. If he ſend a great army, the people cannot maintain them: if a little one, they will drive them out of it: if he duly adjuſt the proportion of troops, between what will keep the country in ſubjection, and what it can ſupport, the expedition will at beſt but pay its own charges; and nothing will remain to the Crown of France. Indeed, how ſhould there be any thing? According to the preſent laws of war, the utmoſt, which a French army could do, would be to oblige the people to quarter their ſoldiers, and to pay to the Crown of France the ſame taxes, which they now

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do to their own ſovereign *. Would a ſingle floren of that money find its way to Paris, in that caſe, more than does now to London? Are general officers ſuch good managers for the crown revenue? Would not they find uſes enough to employ it, where they are, or pretences to put it into their own pockets? Will the people pay their taxes to their enemies more chearfully, than to their natural ſovereign? Or will it be collected, and remitted to Paris, upon cheaper terms, by thirty thouſand commiſſioners of this revenue, than it can be by the civil officers to their own Elector in time of peace? And yet, till we can prove how much comes to England, we need not fear the King of France's being enriched by it in time of war.

Hanover in itſelf therefore cannot be a ſufficient object to induce a great kingdom to ſend its troops thither merely to diſtreſs the poor inhabitants: by which it is likely to ruin all their diſcipline, and turn them into thieves and banditti; and from which it can propoſe to draw nothing to itſelf, but the odium of an unjuſt invaſion of the rights of innocent people. All Europe, after one campaign, would condemn the cruelty and meanneſs of ſuch

* The reader will remember, that in all that was ſaid about the French adminiſtration, the chief document of it, was a decree of the French council, for the receivers of the Electoral revenues to be accountable to a Mr Faidy for the produce of them. And, conſidering, that the decree does not mention a ſyllable of *increaſing* the taxes, the violence ſeems to have been offered to the affections of the people, rather than to their purſes.

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a behaviour in a great kingdom like France; which ſhould thus confeſs its inferiority to its enemy, by ſeeking to revenge its quarrel on a defenceleſs country which had not the leaſt concern in it. And no meaſure could make the French more obnoxious to the Empire, if we would but keep out of it. It would then be a German cauſe, and not an Engliſh one; and the electorate would have a right to call for the aſſiſtance of the Empire in its protection. It might ſuffer a little at firſt perhaps, as the German councils are ſlow; but from the nature of things it is evident, that the French army never would ſtay in it more than a ſingle winter. The French therefore would not think it worth their while to go thither, unleſs they were ſure to find an army in Engliſh pay to fight with, and juſtify their coming thither.

I now add, that whenever an Engliſh army is there, they always will go thither; becauſe that is the moſt advantageous method of carrying on the war for them, and the moſt diſadvantageous for England. It muſt be ſo as long as the preſent war ſhall laſt: becauſe England has ſo great a ſuperiority at ſea, that they have no other country to go to. The French have now no one place to fight us in, unleſs we find for them a field of battle in Germany. They cannot invade England: if they could, there would not be a man of their army in Germany. But their troops probably would not embark on board their tranſports, after having ſeen their fleet deſtroyed, which ſhould have protected

them; or, if they would, they could not get out. They cannot ſend over their troops in a ſufficient number to attack us in the Weſt-Indies; no, nor to defend themſelves, if a pure regard to Britain's good could have prevailed with us to attack them there either the laſt winter or this: becauſe their ports were all blocked up. The French troops therefore, muſt either have remained at home unemployed, or be ſent into Germany. And, at a time, when they were precluded from invading England, and their Weſt-India iſlands lay all naked and expoſed to us; whither could they wiſh to transfer the war, rather than into Germany, where they have nothing to loſe, or be in fear for; and where could they wiſh to have us meet them, rather than in a country, where we have nothing to hope for?

Should any one in anſwer to this, alledge that Britain has nothing to loſe in Germany, any more than France has. I anſwer, Yes. England has its greateſt ſtake there; it has H——r to loſe. Should the reader demur to this, and raiſe a doubt, whether that country be really of ſo much importance to Britain; I cannot anſwer this doubt: but if it be not of that importance, what then are we fighting for? Why have we been ſpending twelve millions in Germany, to defend, only from inſult, that which cannot be of ſo much worth to us; or to prevent the French from getting into a country, where they will find nothing to tempt their ſtay, or to remit to their own crown, when they have been there?

Shall

Shall then the innocent Hanoverians be quartered upon, and oppreſſed by the French troops, and the Engliſh not attack them? Not, if we have any compaſſion for the Electorate: for then the French will always go thither. And how cruel a hardſhip ſhall we bring upon the country, if we thus make it the ſeat of our wars: or when will there be an end of the poor people's ſorrows, if by thus conſidering them as part of ourſelves, we furniſh all nations with the means of annoying us; and make the Hanoverians backs rue the ſmart of every quarrel, which may happen to ariſe between Britain, and any other powers upon the continent?

But ſome perhaps may ſay, *Let who will attack the Electorate upon our account, we will revenge its cauſe.* We may, if we pleaſe, reſolve that we will defend it againſt every power in Europe; but, without being at a greater expence to maintain that government than our own, we cannot defend it againſt any. This is an evil which neceſſarily ariſes out of its diſtance from us. The parliament may addreſs for it; and generous Britiſh hearts may feel for it; but they cannot protect it: either from the French, when they are pleaſed formally to attack it; or from any of the leſſer States of the Empire, if they chooſe ſuddenly to over-run it. Do we doubt of this? The courſe of the war has afforded but too many proofs of our inability in this reſpect. How did the war begin? The ſcene in Germany opened with our being in alliance with the Empreſs Queen. And the K. of P——a, un-

 der

der the encouragement of France, was threatening to invade the E———te. We looked over all the other parts of Europe in vain; and ſent to the fartheſt North, and agreed to give five hundred thouſand pounds to the court of Ruſſia, to march fifty-five thouſand men into P——a, in order to find that Prince employment at home. We afterwards perceived, that this Ruſſian diverſion, which was to march through Poland, would be ineffectual: what then was to be done? That was the only reſource which Britain had for defending it; and that failed. We were then forced to ſee our inability; and by renouncing our treaty with Ruſſia, and giving up our old allies, were made to buy off an evil which we could not repell. And being thus brought into a ſtate of dependence upon a ſingle ally, he knew how to improve it from one ſtep to another, till we are at length reduced to an appearance at leaſt of being tributaries to a King of P——a.

Here, perhaps, a generous Engliſh breaſt may revolt againſt the expreſſion, and diſdain to own, that the money we pay to Pruſſia, is a tribute. *He is our ally, and we pay him a ſubſidy, but not a tribute.* Let us conſider then the nature of each, and what it is, which conſtitutes the difference between them. A ſubſidy is an honourable penſion, given by one State to another, in conſideration of ſervices done, or benefits to be received. Thus, for inſtance, the five hundred thouſand pounds we were

to

to pay to Ruſſia, would have been a ſubſidy, becauſe we were to have an army of fifty-five thouſand men in return for it: and the expoſing of his country as a frontier to Hanover and the letting us his troops, is a ſervice done by the Landgrave of Heſſe, and therefore the money paid him, is a ſubſidy. But what is it, that the K. of P——a has done for the money we pay to him? Was his having fallen upon a Proteſtant Electorate, and his deſtroying Saxony, a ſervice done to Britain? Was that the act of merit, which conſtitutes this payment a ſubſidy? Will this nation take upon itſelf the blood of a hundred thouſand German Proteſtants, and avow the ſhedding of it as a benefit received?——Is it then his having attacked the Empreſs Queen? whether juſtly or not, is his concern; whether advantageouſly for England, is only ours. That cannot be the benefit received; for we have already ſeen, that the lighting up a civil war in Germany, and much more the involving that part of it, which we ought moſt to wiſh the welfare of, in a quarrel with the Diet, and the other Princes of the Empire, cannot be a ſervice done to England, whatever it may be to France

But the Empreſs Queen refuſed to defend the Electorate. True, ſhe alledged her own danger: and therefore he encreaſed that danger: and by preſſing her ſo much the more, drove her into a cloſer union with our enemy: by which ſhe had been before induced to put into the hands of France,

Nieuport

Nieuport and Oſtend; and may poſſibly be driven to cede to the Ruſſians, ſuch a part of their future conqueſts, as may give them a vote in the diet, and thereby diſtract the German councils ſo much the more. Are theſe ſuch valuable conſiderations to Britain, as to make this a ſubſidy? Once indeed he fought with the French, in the Imperial army at Roſbach; but fought them as his own enemies, and not ours. The French, to ſave appearances with their allies, marched out of their way to attack him; otherwiſe he had not ſhewn the leaſt diſpoſition to go out of his to ſerve us.

Does he then ſupply our army with troops? There were, it is ſaid, in the campaign of Crevelt, two Pruſſian regiments of horſe, who refuſed to charge the French, and thereby loſt us the faireſt opportunity, we ever had, of defeating them. But ſuppoſing, that they had done their duty; two or three regiments cannot be an equivalent for ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds. In Queen Anne's war, the ſubſidy paid to a King of Pruſſia, was fifty thouſand pounds; for which, we ſent his troops to fight the French in Savoy. But what is the benefit, which this much greater ſum is the purchaſe of? It will be difficult to name any real ſervice he can do to Britain; though it may be eaſy to ſee the miſchief, he can do elſewhere.

If we look into the three laſt treaties with him, we ſhall have ſtill more reaſon to think that he is bound

bound to no ſervice whatſoever. Some general expreſſions there are about a common cauſe, which he ſeems left at liberty to interpret to his own convenience. What is the common cauſe, between two parties, who have no common enemy? We are not at war with the houſe of Auſtria, and he will tell us, he is not at war with France. The treaty does not oblige him to yield us any ſpecific aſſiſtance; yet we give him more than the whole amount of the ſubſidies, which in Queen Anne's war, we paid to our German allies all put together. We deliver up our money to him, for this one cogent reaſon, becauſe he wants it; and that ſeems the only thing there certainly determined, that he will have it: he will have it all at one payment, immediately upon the ratification; the uſe he is to make of it, is to raiſe troops, to ſtrengthen himſelf, without his being obliged to ſend a man to us; he is to fight his own battles, and not ours *; and by his victories, to enable himſelf to demand the more of us. If by any of theſe treaties, he guaranties the Electorate, his actions have already ſhewn, that he underſtands by it nothing more than the not attacking it himſelf: for ſo far was he, after the firſt treaty, from ſending an army to keep the French out of Hanover, that he withdrew his troops

* The reader may ſee this treaty in the appendix, which is the more worth his peruſal, becauſe he will find no treaty like it, ſince the time of King John.

out of Weſel, in order to let them into it. The ſum given, therefore, ſeems not calculated to purchaſe a defence, ſo much as to keep off an attack; that is, it is a conſideration paid to buy off an evil of ſuffering, which is the ſtrict definition of a tribute. And if Britain will ſingly undertake the defence of ſo remote a country, it muſt ſubmit to ſee that famous ſentence reverſed: *Auro, non Ferro, Liberanda eſt.*

But the King of Pruſſia is a great Prince: and B——n may ſubmit to pay him juſt fourteen times the price *, which was agreed for the redemption of Rome. Still there is no end of the troubles of the Electorate, upon this miſtaken plan of defending it; for now, that we have diſcovered to Europe our weak part, we have put it in the power of every the meaneſt Prince in Germany to inſult us, and make us buy it over again; for we can defend it againſt none of them.

I have already hinted the poſſibility of an Elector of Saxony's ſeeking an indemnification for his ſubjects ſufferings, on another Electorate, which he may think to have too largely contributed to them. But Britain may not always have the honour of a crowned head to contend with. Suppoſe a Duke of Wirtemberg, as he has already changed his reli-

* A thouſand pound weight of gold.

gion,

gion, poſſibly with a view to a tenth Electorate; ſhould be fed with that hope, and perſuaded by the Imperial court to invade Hanover. Could Britain defend it againſt him? Not without an expence of many millions. We may think the troops of the Electorate itſelf are a match for his, and ſo they are. But we have heard of a French army's entering the Empire under the title of troops of the circle of Burgundy. Or, a peace being made, ſoldiers of fortune enough may be brought, by the Court of Vienna's encouragement, and French money, to engage in that Prince's ſervice. Or why may not the French themſelves march down their troops to the Rhine, and break them on one ſide of the river, to croſs over and become troops of Wirtemberg on the other? This has been the method, in which the French have executed their treaties, even after a ſpecific renunciation, which in our future treaty cannot be thought of *. To compleat the *accablement*, perhaps his Majeſty of Pruſſia may chooſe to hold the balance of power even between the two contending houſes of B———k and Wirtemberg: and Britain, by attempting things out of its power, may give that petty Prince the honour of beating us, with whom it is a diſgrace to us to con-

* By the Pyrenean treaty, the French court formally abandoned the Portugueſe. But Marſhal Schomberg went into Portugal, with a body of French troops; whom he paid with the money of Lewis the XIVth, though he pretended to maintain them in the name of the King of Portugal. Theſe troops, being joined by the Portugueze forces, obtained a complete victory at Villa Vicioſa; which fixed the crown in the houſe of Braganza. VOLTAIRE.

tend. Such are the effects of a miſtaken act of duty. By thus conſidering a diſtant country as a part of Britain, and diſcovering too great a fondneſs for it, we expoſe the poor people of it to continual broils and miſery, and intail perpetual ignominy on B——n, by attempting to defend them. They may juſtly come within our compaſſion; but for that very reaſon, we ought to ſeparate our cauſe from theirs, becauſe they are far removed out of our protection. Could the Electorate ever have been deſigned to make a part of us, and to be thus tender to us as the apple of our eye; it would have been placed under the guard of our front, and not out of the reach even of our hands *.

But the two houſes of parliament, it is ſaid, *have promiſed that they will defend the Electorate.* If they were ſo improvident as to promiſe ſuch a thing, we have now found it to be impoſſible: the fault therefore muſt be in the making ſuch a pro-

* The author hopes, that nothing in theſe ſheets will be miſinterpreted to the diſadvantage of a country, for which he thinks that every good ſubject ought to have the ſincereſt regard. 'Tis the pointing out what appears to him the moſt effectual method of ſecuring it from the preſent and future attacks of our enemies, which makes one principal end of theſe Conſiderations. Much leſs would he knowingly ſay any thing on the ſubject, which ſhould not expreſs the moſt reſpectful duty and reverence towards the beſt of ſovereigns He conſiders the argument of the next head, of perfect and imperfect obligation, as a point of ethics, and not of politics: and therefore the reader may paſs it over, if the objection does not ſtrike him.

miſe,

miſe, and not in the non-performance of it; becauſe no promiſe binds to impoſſibilities. This is the ſhort anſwer, and might ſuffice. But poſſibly, there may be thoſe, who after having made their court, by running the nation into a greater expence for the German war, than it had then the leaſt idea of; may hope to make their excuſe to the people, by pretending that they have done it only in conſequence of a former vote. Thus are Britain's treaſures to be laviſhed away in millions, and more money ſpent on the German war alone, than the whole ſea and land ſervice coſt in the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns; and inſtead of ſeeking to redreſs ourſelves, we are to be diſputing who did it. If it has been wrong, and no one will avow the paſt, let no one adopt the future. The time may come, when the nation, being exhauſted by the German war, and perhaps intimidated by that very Prince it is now upholding, may be forced to give up its own conqueſts to buy him a peace. Then every member of the adminiſtration will diſown this exceſſive regard to Germany, and each individual will ſay, that for his part he was always againſt it. If he expect that we ſhould then believe him, let him openly diſown it now. Now let them ſtand up each in his place, and declare that they are for ſerving their country, and defending Germany, in a practicable way; by attacking the French in their iſlands, by which only they can be formidable to Britain, and thereby ſecuring an ample indemnification for that part of

Germany, for which alone we ought to have any concern. Now they may put a ſtop to the ruinous part of the war; and ſave their country; and ſave themſelves from the charge of having gained the good opinion of the public, by expreſsly declaring againſt theſe meaſures, and then making uſe of that popularity to carry them to an infinitely greater heighth, than any other men could have thought of. Now, I ſay, they may ſave themſelves and ſave the public; but if they will go on, bidding againſt each other, till their countries treaſures ſhall be exhauſted; an injured nation, robbed of its beſt conqueſts, muſt then conclude, that they are all equally blameable.

But the public faith is a ſubject we may prance high upon; and it may eaſily be ſaid, that being once engaged, it ought ſacredly to be obſerved. The public faith, engaged by act of parliament, upon a valuable conſideration given; as that given to creditors of the public, who advance money upon it, is doubtleſs a perfect obligation, and ought to be obſerved with the ſtricteſt ſanctity. But does any one really think, that a complimental addreſs of either, or both houſes of parliament, carries in it ſuch a complete obligation? Has the addreſs of either houſe, the validity of an act of parliament? The reſolutions of a houſe of commons, are in point of obligation on that ſame houſe of commons (for upon a future one they lay no obligation at all) to be conſidered as any other declaration of the reſolutions of private men. They

ought

ought to declare no more than they really intend, ſo far as things then appear to them, to be conſiſtent with ſincerity ; and ſo long as things continue in the ſtate, which they appeared in at the time of declaring thoſe reſolutions, they are bound to keep to them, to preſerve the character of conſtancy. If upon trial made, they find the thing reſolved on, to be either impoſſible, or impracticable, or to be attended with much greater difficulties than they had imagined, or greater expence than the thing itſelf is worth, they may then, upon this better information, alter thoſe reſolutions, without any impeachment either of their ſincerity or their conſtancy. Every civilian knows, that this is the nature of an imperfect obligation, or of a promiſe, made without a valuable conſideration to be given for it. And every other man may know how far a reſolution of the houſe of commons is to be depended on.

They began the laſt war with a reſolution, as they did this ; and reſolved that they would make no peace, till the Spaniards ſhould renounce the right of ſearch ; and they never after thought any more of it. I might add, we ſuffered our heads to be turned with German politics ; and inſtead of conquering for ourſelves, we at laſt forgot both the Spaniſh war and the French, and ſpent our money in Germany againſt the King of Pruſſia, for fear he ſhould get, what we are now ſpending ſtill more millions to prevent his loſing.

Should

Should any one ſtill urge, that the promiſe to defend the Electorate, was not a ſimple promiſe, but a perfect obligation, I now anſwer in the firſt place, that the parliament never did promiſe to defend it. The words of the addreſs are; *We think ourſelves bound in juſtice and gratitude to aſſiſt your Majeſty againſt inſults and attacks, that may be made upon any of your Majeſty's dominions, though not belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, in reſentment of the part your Majeſty has taken in a cauſe, wherein the intereſts of this kingdom are immediately, and ſo eſſentially concerned.* The declaring, that they think themſelves bound in juſtice and gratitude to aſſiſt in the defence of his Majeſty's foreign dominions, is ſurely a very different thing from the taking upon themſelves the whole and abſolute defence of them. The very promiſe of aſſiſting another, carries in it, the ſuppoſition of the perſon himſelf, exerting his own force in the ſame cauſe; otherwiſe it is not aſſiſting him, but doing the thing ourſelves. And has the parliament failed in this promiſe? Have they not done more than was promiſed? Have they not taken all the Electoral troops, which are in the field, into their pay, and far from not aſſiſting, born the expence of the whole*? Even formal

* The argument here does not require, nor does the author intend any diſreſpectful ſuppoſition, that the Electorate has not contributed what it can to its own defence. Poſſibly the maintenance of its garriſons, and its civil government, may nearly employ its whole force. The diſtinction intended, is, between a promiſe to aſſiſt, and a promiſe abſolutely to defend, which are ſurely very different engagements.

treaties of alliance and mutual aſſiſtance between independent nations, do not bind either party to any farther aſſiſtance, than the obligation ſpecifically expreſſed. Thus for inſtance, to take that, to which the addreſs itſelf refers, by the treaty with Ruſſia, the Empreſs was to aſſiſt us with but ſuch a ſpecific number of troops, and we were to aſſiſt her with ſuch a ſpecific ſum of money. And even in caſes of the moſt perfect and full alliance; where two States expreſly covenant to aſſiſt each other *totis viribus*, as is the caſe between the Dutch and us, yet all the writers on the law of nations agree, that this covenant does not imply an obligation upon one State, to ruin itſelf in the defence of another. *Succuram perituro, ſed ut ipſe non peream*, is the judgment of Seneca, adopted by Grotius. *Defendi debent ſocii, ſive in tutelam ſeſe & fidem aliorum dederunt, ſive mutua auxilia pacti ſunt. Illud vero addamus, ne tunc quidem teneri ſocium, ſi nulla ſpes ſit boni exitus: boni enim, non mali cauſa ſocietas contrahitur* *.

We think ourſelves bound in juſtice and gratitude, to aſſiſt againſt inſults and attacks: is not this the very language of compliment? And can any one ſuppoſe, that this contains a perfect obligation, like that, which is made by a ſpecific alliance between two independent nations, upon a valuable conſideration given? In the firſt place, in reſpect

* Puffend. & Grot. Lib. 2do, cap. 5to.

of

of the party bound, it cannot affect the people of England: for they can be bound only by an act of parliament; and as to the houſe itſelf, it is in them a declaration only of their preſent ſentiments, and cannot preclude them from the right of altering thoſe ſentiments, upon farther information: becauſe, in the ſecond place, the party, to whom the promiſe is made, being not to give any ſpecific valuable conſideration in conſequence of that declaration, can have no ſtrict right conveyed thereby to the performance. Should it be ſaid, that what had been already done, was the valuable conſideration given, every one muſt ſee that a favour voluntarily conferred before hand, cannot make the ſpecific conſideration of a future covenant. The only proper right, which that confers, is an obligation of gratitude. But an obligation of gratitude, in the very idea of it, leaves the party obliged, a right of judging of the nature and extent of the grateful returns he is to make.

But it was then ſaid, that this ſhould be the return, the aſſiſting in caſe of attack. If therefore the obligation ariſes out of the declaration of Parliament, then that promiſe can imply an obligation to nothing more, than what was meant by it at the time of making it. Now there is no one, who remembers the paſſing of that addreſs, but muſt alſo remember, that at that time, and for at leaſt a year after, it was the avowed ſenſe of all parties, and confirmed by repeated aſſurances, that

not a man ſhould be ſent to the continent. Whether we ſhould ſend money or not, as ſubſidies, to hire foreign troops, was made a matter of doubt, and the debate upon the motion, turned upon the ſubſidy treaties with Ruſſia, and with the Landgrave of Heſſe. But all parties expreſsly declared, that they would not ſend a man out of the kingdom.

Could it be conceived, even the next ſeſſions, when repeated aſſurances were given that no Engliſh troops ſhould be ſent to Germany, that the nation then actually ſtood bound by the obligation of a promiſe, to ſend thither a greater body of Britiſh troops, and thoſe to be under a foreign General too *, than the Duke of Marlborough was ever intruſted with? or than our great deliverer King William carried out with him, only to the mouths of the great rivers in the Netherlands? If the nation then ſtood bound by the obligation of ſuch a promiſe, why did any gentleman miſlead the pub-

* Nothing in theſe ſheets will be intended to ſerve one party againſt another. In comparing the Britiſh forces, ſent to the continent in this war, and in former ones, the contraſt is heightened by the greater number being ſent to be under a foreign general. But if the nation is to riſk ſo great a body of its ſubjects under any general; ſurely we cannot have too good an one. I could wiſh indeed, that he had been an Engliſhman; becauſe then we might have valued ourſelves upon his great abilities, as more certainly ours. Whereas, if the preſent ſyſtem of our adopting German quarrels ſhould be continued, it may very poſſibly be our chance, in the next war, to have all thoſe abilities employed againſt us.

lick by ſuch aſſurances to the contrary? If the addreſs did not contain any ſuch promiſe, whence this failure in his own?

In ſhort, men may talk big about the publick faith, but every one knows what is meant by a reſolution of the houſe. If they thought that ſuch a declaration might be of uſe to deter the King of Pruſſia from entering the Electorate, it was a kindneſs done, or intended at leaſt, to make it. Certainly it was a proper act of duty, to let the world ſee, by ſuch a declaration, the ſtrict harmony, which ſubſiſted between his Majeſty and his ſubjects. But no one ever thought before, that ſuch a reſolution implied any thing more than an intention to aſſiſt in a reaſonable degree, and in a practicable manner. And, if we found one way of doing it too heavy a burden for us, then to try another. And if, upon all the other powers in Germany failing us, or declaring againſt us, we found that our aſſiſtance muſt at laſt be ineffectual; then to attack the French on their coaſts, and in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, ſo much the more vigorouſly, in order to obtain by our conqueſts, an indemnity to our friends for their paſt ſufferings, and a full ſecurity againſt any future attacks. *Nec ſervanda promiſſa, quæ ſint iis, quibus promiſeris inutilia, nec ſi plus tibi noceant, quam illi proſint, cui promiſeris* *.

* Cic. de Off.

The

The reader may by this time probably be fully ſatisfied on this head: and therefore I willingly omit the inſiſting on another plea, which totally ſets aſide the obligation of any promiſe. And that is the change in the ſtate of the parties, which has been twice made ſince that declaration. Let it be a promiſe, yet it was to defend the Electorate againſt the King of Pruſſia and the French, the reſt of the Empire being with us; and to take a body of Heſſians, and fifty-five thouſand Ruſſians into our pay, who were to fight for the defence of it. If after that the aſſiſtance offered be renounced, and a new agreement made with the King of Pruſſia, who was not bound by it to ſend a man to fight in any cauſe of ours, and who would embroil the Electorate with the Empire; does a promiſe of granting aſſiſtance in one way, give a claim to it in every other way? The promiſe was, to pay Ruſſians to fight againſt Pruſſians; is the paying Pruſſians to fight againſt Ruſſians, due to the performance?

Still the Britiſh nation expreſſed its duty as it ought; and though the Ruſſian force was thrown into the oppoſite ſcale, took upon itſelf the pay of all the Hanoverian troops that were fighting in the field in defence of their own country, and a body of Heſſians beſide; when the Hanoverian chancery made a ſecond total change in the ſtate of parties, and agreed to leave the French in poſſeſſion of their

country. Here was a total renouncing of all their connections with Britain, though their troops were then actually in its pay. That neutrality was, it is ſaid, made without the knowledge of the Engliſh government, certainly without the knowledge of parliament; and that therefore could not be bound by its conſequences. A total change therefore having been twice made in the ſtate of parties from that which ſubſiſted at the time of making thoſe addreſſes, all the plea of obligation from them ceaſed. *Tunc fidem fallam, tunc inconſtantiæ crimen audiam, ſi cum omnia eadem ſint, quæ erant promittente me, non præſtitero promiſſum. Alioquin, quicquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro conſulendi, & me fide liberat* *.

The reader will excuſe my having ſo largely conſidered this point. As I am taking that ſide of an argument, which has the popular prejudice againſt it, it was neceſſary that I ſhould leave no plauſible objection behind me unanſwered. I now return to my ſubject, which is ſingly confined to Germany; far from condemning, I deſire to expreſs my thankfulneſs for every thing, which has been done during the war, in every other part of the world.

The intention of theſe ſheets, has been to inquire, and ſubmit to the public conſideration, whether the preſent courſe we have taken of transferring the Engliſh war with France into Germany be not a

* Sen. de Benef. Lib. iv. cap. 35.

meaſure,

meaſure, calculated for the hurt of Germany, rather than of France; and tending to promote the intereſt of France, rather than of England. In the proſecution of this argument I have attempted to ſhew, that Britain's joining and making itſelf a party in any of the internal quarrels of the Empire, and eſpecially its ſending troops thither upon any ſuch account, muſt be, at all times, contrary to the intereſt of Europe, and contrary to the intereſt of Germany; and in the preſent caſe, contrary to the intereſt of Proteſtantiſm, and contrary to the peace and true intereſt of Hanover. I am now to conſider the German war, in a more important light, and offer to the publick conſideration my reaſons for doubting, whether it be not a method of carrying on a war with France, which is to England ruinous and impracticable; and which therefore, if too long perſiſted in, muſt probably end in the giving to France an undue aſcendancy over us; and expoſe us to the neceſſity of ſuing for peace, at the expence of our moſt valuable conqueſts. Whether on the other hand, there be not a method of carrying on the war, by which we have it in our power at this time to maintain a ſuperiority over our enemy, and intail it to our poſterity: by which we may be enabled to carry on the war at the expence of France, and not of Britain; and at laſt conclude it by a peace, which ſhall remove the chief ground of rivalſhip between the two nations; and thereby give ſecurity to Britain for many years to come.

I ſhould

I ſhould not at preſent have mentioned this latter part of my deſign, if I did not ſee it neceſſary to guard againſt the ſuſpicion, that any thing, which ſhall be offered to prove the impracticableneſs of this part of the war, is intended as a plea for the abruptly putting an end to the whole. Providence has been pleaſed to preſent to our view, the means of ſolid peace and independence: and to have reſerved for the peculiar glory of his Majeſty's reign, the placing our iſland in a ſtate of happineſs, unknown to our anceſtors in any period of our hiſtory. Britain now gains, by a Britiſh ſovereign, a greater advantage over France, than even Henry the Second brought with him to the crown, with half the provinces of France in his poſſeſſion. We have now a more important alternative offered to our choice, than will probably ever be propoſed to us again. We have now no leſs an option to make, than whether we will laviſh away five millions a year in Germany, without a poſſibility of doing that or England any good, and annually run the kingdom ten millions in debt; till it ſhall be at length exhauſted, and unable to defend either: or whether we will realize to this nation a revenue of five millions a year for ever, at our enemies expence; and totally diſable France hereafter from raiſing a marine power, which can ever be in any degree formidable to Britain. Whether we will riſk our country's ruin in a German war, which tends to nothing; or whether we will conquer for ourſelves

ourſelves and Germany both, by ſecuring an ample indemnification for the paſt ſufferings of the Electorate, and effectually deterring our enemies from any future invaſion of it. Let us but go on, and by one more eaſy conqueſt, diſable the navy of France from ever riſing again, and the peace of this iſland is then fixed on its firm and proper baſis; and we may thenceforward look on all the quarrels of the continent with indifference.

And what is this Germany to Britain? Could we but be true to ourſelves, and purſue the advantage, which providence has put into our hands, and by ſeizing our enemies iſlands, make ourſelves maſters of that trade: we might then give the French the offer of peace or war, as long as they ſhall chooſe: for all the motives for our going to war with them, and all the means of their coming to war with us, would be at an end. Let then the French rage as they pleaſe; let them bribe and threaten the ſeveral German courts, till they ſhall learn to unite; let the Empire ſuffer French armies to march from the Rhine to the utmoſt Danube; and pillage every city in their paſſage, from Manheim to Belgrade; all theſe cannot build them a ſingle frigate to annoy our coaſt with. Britain may then calmly look on in ſecurity; and thankful for its own independence, need feel no other ſentiments ariſe upon the occaſion, than thoſe of Chriſtian compaſſion. Not that any thing of this nature really would happen. On the contrary, the peace of Germany would be

better ſecured, as well as that of Britain. For the great ſource of their wealth being cut off with their iſlands, the French would thenceforward be as little able to march their armies out of their own territory, and maintain them in Germany, as the Germans are now to ſend their armies into France. Should this prove too great a happineſs, for us to be allowed to conquer for ourſelves; we muſt then fight for the King of Pruſſia's glory, and a foreign intereſt, in a German war, which I have ſaid, is a war that is ruinous and impracticable. I ſhall now give my reaſons for it. And,

In the firſt place, this is a war, in which Britain ſtands ſingle and alone, to contend at land with France. And how much ſoever we may flatter ourſelves with the notion of our own ſtrength, and the French weakneſs, France is at this time, as it has been for a century paſt, ſuperior to us at land. I have in the beginning of theſe Conſiderations, put this among my poſtulata; but our news writers, who generally ſet the opinions of the times, have been ſo ſtrongly exhibiting the greatneſs of the Engliſh force, that I know not whether I may be allowed to rank it below the French. The reader, however, will remember, that I am not now ſpeaking of our naval ſtrength; and if we could be perſuaded to uſe that power more, and talk of it leſs, we might perhaps be acting a wiſer part. But in comparing the land force of the two nations, tho' we

we may happen this year to have the better general, yet for theſe fourſcore years paſt, all Europe has been complaining of the exorbitant power of France. Either this meant nothing at all, or it meant, that France was more powerful than any other State. Stronger than Germany, for inſtance, and certainly ſtronger than Holland, or than England, which has ordinarily kept up fewer land forces than either of the other two. Soon after the revolution, France alone maintained a war againſt Spain, Germany, Holland, and England, with Denmark, and Sweden in the ſame alliance. And for ſeveral years carried on a war of equality, frequently a war of offence, againſt them all. And in the beginning of this century, France, and part of Spain, ſupported a war of ten years reſiſtance, againſt England, Holland, and Germany, with Denmark, Savoy, and Portugal, united in the ſame cauſe. From that time all parties among us have been complaining, that the treaty of Utrecht gave the French too much power. And I ſuppoſe the reverence for the preceding adminiſtrations, during the two laſt reigns, has not been ſuch as to make us ſay, that the ſuperior abilities of our former miniſters have given ſo great a check to the French land force, as to turn the whole balance of power in our favour. In the laſt war, France diſmantled the barrier of Flanders, and raiſed up a new power in the Empire to counter-balance the natural Head of it: can it then be ſuppoſed that France, which was able to brave all Europe in two preceding wars,

is now all at once, in the beginning of the preſent, reduced ſo low, as to be inferior in its land force to England alone? And that too without having ſuffered any material loſs in it, though France maintained a ſeven years war againſt the grand alliance, after the loſs of forty thouſand of its beſt troops at Blenheim; and after having twenty thouſand more killed and taken at Ramilies, ſtill held out five years longer.

But how can England be ſaid to ſtand ſingle and alone, when it has an alliance with the magnanimous King of Pruſſia? Not, I fear, againſt France, for he has never declared war with it. Againſt the Houſe of Auſtria, he is a willing ally; but we are now conſidering the force of England againſt France; and when Britain is already engaged in a war with France, can it be the ſtronger for adopting another Prince's quarrel with the Houſe of Auſtria? We may eaſily perſuade *ourſelves* that he is an ally againſt France; but it may not be eaſy to ſhew any thing in the convention of the 11th of April, or the ſucceeding treaty, which will convince *him* of it. Poſſibly he may tell us, that that convention regards only the liberty of the Germanick body; and that France, though occaſionally in the preamble, is not once mentioned in the articles themſelves, nor any thing elſe relative to the Engliſh war with it. That the common intereſt means only the intereſt of their two Houſes againſt

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the archducal; and that this convention cannot refer to a war with France, becauſe the two parties covenant not to make any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, without comprehending each other in it: which, he may allege, proves that the treaty only refers to their German quarrels, becauſe he wants no treaty of peace or truce with France, being at peace with it already. I do not ſay that this would be a juſt plea; but if he ſhould think proper to make it, England then ſtands alone in its war with France, as much as if it had not that alliance with his Majeſty of Pruſſia againſt the Empreſs Queen.

But ſtill however he is an ally. By a treaty which obliges us to furniſh him with money, only becauſe he wants it, and which therefore he will never ceaſe to want; and which, upon reading it over, we ſhall be apt to think will not oblige him to furniſh us either with money or troops, ſhould we want them ever ſo much. Nothing is more common than to hear the wars of the two great alliances condemned as conſuming wars; becauſe England, it was ſaid, paid all. Yet all the ſubſidies which King William paid to German Princes, at a time when they had two hundred thouſand men fighting againſt France, do not amount to the half of the ſubſidy we now pay to the King of Pruſſia alone, who could not, or would not garriſon one of his beſt towns for us. In Queen Anne's war, for a ſubſidy of fifty thouſand pounds, we not only ſent

eight thouſand Pruſſians to fight the French in Savoy, but had twelve thouſand more in our pay in Flanders. We now pay him ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand, for which he calls us an ally, and ſuffers us to fight the French ourſelves. What then have we gained by this ally? Two things: the one is the being obliged to pay him money to enable him to fight his own battles, againſt enemies which Britain has no quarrel with: the other is the driving the reſt of German Princes into a cloſer union with France, and making ourſelves obnoxious to Europe for ſupporting this ally: can it be ſuppoſed that Britain is the ſtronger for either of theſe?

But is he not a man of great abilities? Doubtleſs he is ſo; and one of the cleareſt proofs of it is his obliging us to pay him ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds for nothing. In that reſpect he is certainly the greateſt Prince ever known to Britain before. Yet with all that enormous ſum, which is a five times greater ſubſidy than we paid to any German Prince in Queen Anne's wars; and with all his great abilities, he is but juſt able to ſtand himſelf: and we call him an ally, and fancy that he ſupports *us*. We confeſs he lives by miracle, and are wondering every year that he does not fall: and yet this is the Prince which we have placed our only dependence on. We take a pleaſure in recounting the number of enemies he has to contend with, without

once

once conſidering, that we make all thoſe enemies ours, by upholding him againſt them. Inſtead of bethinking ourſelves of the exorbitant expence he is of to us, we make that an argument of his importance; and prove him to be the beſt ally that Britain ever had, becauſe he coſts us more than them all. Baron Bothmar, in Queen Anne's war, was a valuable ally: for he lent us, at the uſual price, a regiment of dragoons. The Prince of Buckbug is ſo in this war; without making us any enemies, he furniſhes us for our money with a brigade of artillery. But our magnanimous ally furniſhes us with new enemies, inſtead of new troops; is, upon the leaſt ſucceſs we gain, drawing away our forces, inſtead of adding to them; and is every year to us, in clear money, juſt ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds leſs than nothing.

But when we have enabled him to conquer all his enemies, he will then help to conquer ours. The Britiſh crown and parliament can avow nothing but what is juſt; but arbitrary Princes, whoſe law of right lies only in their own breaſts, are not always governed by the ſtricteſt rules of gratitude. Their practice has often been to look out for inſtruments fit for their purpoſe, whom they can call allies, and perſuade to do their buſineſs for them firſt, and then to leave them to themſelves to do their own as they can. Their regard to their future advantage, ſometimes weighs more with them, than the remembrance of paſt benefits. Should he think

that our fears for the Electorate make his beſt ſecurity for the continuance of his ſubſidy, he may not think it for his intereſt to remove thoſe fears. On the other hand, many perſons may think that Britain may find it a much harder taſk to conquer his, than it will to conquer its own enemies, if he be not one of them: if he ſhould be one, the leſs we conquer for him the better.

But he is certainly a very great Prince. So we read in our papers about three hundred times a year. Whether the true ſtandard of a Prince's greatneſs conſiſts in his making his own people happy, or thoſe of other countries miſerable, is a queſtion which we are not concerned in. But however we may admire him as a great warrior, or whatever be our idea of his greatneſs, he can never be a uſeful ally to Britain, or contribute in the leaſt degree to ours. What is it that this revival of his claim to Sileſia muſt probably end in? Poſſibly, during his life, by means of his ſuperior abilities, and by making ſometimes France help him, and ſometimes England, he may be juſt able to keep it: but in the mean time he has involved himſelf and his family in a quarrel never to be ended with the Houſe of Auſtria, which will ſeize every opportunity to recover it. Can then a Prince be an uſeful ally to Britain, or afford us any real aſſiſtance, who needs it ſo much himſelf, and knows that he has a determined enemy catching at every occaſion to ſurprize him? Before that either of them can be of any ſervice

to

to Britain, they muſt at leaſt be out of danger themſelves; which from the nature of their quarrel, they never can be free from. Should our preſent ally beat his rival, and force the Empreſs Queen to a treaty, that cannot produce the leaſt degree of confidence between them. Sileſia is to the Auſtrian family ſo great an object in itſelf, and ſo very neceſſary to the defence of their Turkiſh frontier, that they never really will give it up. A treaty will be nothing more than a ſuſpenſion of fighting. All the faith of treaties is at an end with them. He knows that the firſt inſtant they can attack him to advantage, they will break the treaty, from the very ſame principle upon which he revived his claim. In ſhort, the two houſes are committed in an eternal war, which can never end, till one of them is abſolutely ſubdued. Neither of them therefore can be of the leaſt ſervice to Britain, while the other ſurvives. Did ever any one think of gaining aſſiſtance from either of two ſpent warriors, which it ſaw agonizing in a ſtruggle for each other's deſtruction? To France they may either of them be a natural ally; becauſe it is the intereſt of France to keep up continual wars in the Empire. France will naturally ſupport the weaker. But England has no intereſt to ſerve by the internal wars of the Empire; on the contrary, we can never hope for any good from it, but in its union. The intereſt of England therefore, ſince there can be no peace between them, is to let them fight out the quarrel.

quarrel. When one of them is ſubdued, the other will be glad of our alliance, and then only will be worthy of having it.

And what is all this ſlaughter of German Proteſtants to end in! Probably he will either fall in battle, or ſee Sileſia loſt in his life-time; his ſucceſſor at leaſt will not have the ſame opportunities, or the ſame addreſs to make France and England alternately exhauſt themſelves in his defence: and will probably be forced to give it up; after ſeeing an ample vengeance taken on his own dominions, for the ravages committed on the Auſtrian. Will he then appear to have been the friend of Proteſtantiſm, for having in his life-time twice ravaged one Proteſtant Electorate, held a continual rod over another, and at his death given to the Papiſts, a pretence totally to ruin his own? And this is the Prince, whom, becauſe the French firſt raiſed him up to embroil one part of Germany, and becauſe we know that he can too eaſily join with them to embroil another, we call a great man, and think that we can never enough admire him. Nay, are nurſing and making greater, to enable him to demand of Britain ſo much the more, and to ſerve France ſo much the better. For to France only he can be a ſerviceable ally: to Britain he can be at moſt, but the terror of an Electorate, the idol of the crowd, and the Hero of a News-Paper.

I return

I return therefore to my firſt poſition, that in this German war, Britain ſtands ſingle and unaided againſt France: and the land forces of France are more numerous than thoſe of England.

We may be told perhaps, that *riches are the ſinews of war*; and our news-papers will teach us to value ourſelves upon our having contracted eight or twelve millions of new debt this year, (for I know it may be conſidered differently) as much as if we had paid off ſo many of the old. But money will not hire troops to fight in a cauſe, which all the powers of Europe are averſe to. Will the Ruſſians, or Swedes, or any of the States of the Empire lend us forces to fight againſt themſelves? Have not the Dutch and Danes refuſed us? Can the King of Pruſſia help us? On the contrary, is he not daily ſending recruits to our enemies? By ravaging Saxony he is driving its Proteſtant inhabitants to deſpair, and laying them under the hard neceſſity of reſorting for bread to their Prince Xavier's ſtandards in the French army. The reſources of our enemies are infinite. France exceeds Great Britain in the number of its people; and by the nature of its government, is able to ſend out as many of its ſubjects to its military ſervices, as their King ſhall be pleaſed to order: and, beſides its own ſuperior reſources, France has Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Flanders to recruit out of. What has England to oppoſe to all theſe? Nothing but the bodies of its own ſubjects, which can

very ill be ſpared from its agriculture and manufactures, and the levies from the diſtricts of Hanover and Heſſe. We may think that we have been rather ſucceſsful in Germany in the two laſt campaigns, which perhaps may eaſily be accounted for: but is it poſſible not to ſee the inequality, in the numbers of men at leaſt, which there is between us and our enemies?

Can England then, by its money alone, be a match for all Europe? If we were ſo, is it fit that we ſhould wantonly declare it, and thereby give umbrage to every other ſtate? Money may, in a qualified ſenſe, be allowed to be the ſinews of war; but it muſt find men to make up the fleſh and ſubſtance of our armies, which, in the preſent ſtate of Europe, is impoſſible. In ſhort, all things have their fixt meaſure and bounds; and the preſent war continuing, and parties remaining affected as they now are, increaſe the French revenue to the double of what it is, you cannot render the French navy equal to the Engliſh; nor could the ſame addition of wealth to England make its number of land forces equal to the French.

Thus far we have argued upon the ſuppoſition, that the Engliſh revenue was greater than the French. But is that the real ſtate of the caſe? The ordinary revenue of France, I fear, is greater than that of England. What the amount of this is, I confeſs I do not know; but I form my judgment

judgment upon the view of it, which was given us the laſt ſeſſions, by a gentleman, who from his office, may be ſuppoſed to underſtand it beſt: and who very candidly ſtated the ſubject, and left his hearers, if they had pleaſed, to draw the conſequences. The ſtanding revenue of France, we were then told, is twelve millions; five of them are anticipated, and the remaining ſeven, ſubject to any deficiencies in the other five, make the preſent revenue of France. Beſides this, they have borrowed two millions; and theſe nine millions make the whole fund of France for carrying on the war; which he was pleaſed to ſay, was a ſum, very inadequate to the expence of ſuch a war. Now then let us conſider, what is the Engliſh revenue to oppoſe to this. The ſtanding revenue of England for carrying on a war, is the land and malt tax, which amount to two millions ſeven hundred and fifty thouſand pound: to which may be added, ſo much as can be taken out of the ſinking fund: though ſome perſons may conſider that as already pre-engaged. But allowing however a million and half to be taken thence, we have then four millions to oppoſe to the French revenue of ſeven millions. But beſide this, we have borrowed for this year, twelve millions; eight millions on annuities, and four on the ſinking fund. Go on then for two years longer on this plan: France at the three years end, will be ſix millions in debt; and England, if we reckon the twelve millions borrowed, will be

thirty ſix. If we allow but the eight millions borrowed, England will be twenty four millions in debt. Can we need a more convincing proof, that this is a ruinous war?

But why are the French nine millions a ſum very inadequate to the expence of ſuch a war? No one choſe to aſk the queſtion, though every thing was ſtated with the greateſt fairneſs and preciſion. Fifteen millions is certainly a greater ſum than nine. But France has fitted out no fleet this year. Our navy coſts us five million ſix hundred thouſand pounds; though it has been all the ſummer employed in no one offenſive ſervice. This at once reduces the ſtock of the two nations for the land war, to nine millions, and ten millions. Add to this, the charges of tranſporting men and horſes; the fleet of tranſports to be kept always in readineſs for every emergency; the difference of Engliſh and French pay; and the much greater facility, which the French have of recruiting and ſupporting their troops from the Rhine and Main; conſider theſe, and many other diſadvantages we are under; and we ſhall not think the French nine millions a ſum at all inadequate to any purpoſes, which we can effect at that diſtance with our ten. Their ordinary revenue, if they have ſeven millions, on the preſent plan of the war, will enable them to bring more men into the field, without borrowing at all, than we can by getting every year eight millions in debt.

Every

Every one, who has thought on the ſubject of war, muſt have conſidered the three different kinds of it: a war of offence, a war of equality, and a war of defence. And every one knows, that of theſe, the laſt is moſt diſadvantageous and the moſt difficult. Where an army is to defend itſelf only, a general will find employment for all his attentions: but if it be to defend a long tract of country; unleſs the attacking general be greatly inferior in his art, he will uſually prevail. The reaſon is, that the general, who acts offenſively, has it in his own choice, when and where to direct his main force; whereas the defender muſt equally divide his: and if the attacking general fail in one deſign, he ſuffers little, but is ready to try another: and ſomewhere, at ſome unguarded time, he will find an opportunity to come with five thouſand, where the defenders have but one. Lines of defence may perhaps be made effectual in countries, cut by impaſſable canals, where there is no marching but on the Dykes of them: and yet, even there, the French never formed lines, which the Duke of Marlborough did not paſs: but an inland open country, like Hanover and Heſſe, is not to be covered, but by a ſuperior army; and that ought not to do it, but to act offenſively. The Duke of Cumberland found it ſo in the firſt campaign; our ſucceeding general, with all his abilities, has found it ſo ever ſince. Both ſummers the French have forced their way into Heſſe, and this year they have again poſſeſſed themſelves of a part of Hanover:

and

and every year have brought a ſuperiority of numbers into the field: as great a ſuperiority, as they ought in good policy to ſend to that ſervice, whatever be the number of their forces at home. I know indeed that our General, by the ſtrength of his genius, has been able to make a ſtand againſt them, and linger out the campaign without ſuffering any defeat; and this we call a victory, and are elated with the ſucceſs. Yet this is the very kind of war, which the intereſt of the French ſhould make them wiſh. Juſt the contrary meaſure is, politically conſidered, the deſirable one for England: to bring the matter to an immediate iſſue, and ſeek the French upon the firſt open ground they have to paſs, and force them to a pitched battle. To this it is eaſily anſwered, that neither the Duke of Cumberland nor Prince Ferdinand were ſtrong enough to do this. I acknowledge that they were not: and I ſay further, that they never will be: for whatever force we may ſend to Germany, France will always ſend a greater. It has more troops than England; and while the Engliſh councils perſiſt ſingly to engage in a land war with France, they ever muſt be inferior, and ever muſt act only on the defenſive.

Can we think of loading our revenue with a greater debt, and raiſing more money than we did laſt year? And ſurely no friend of his country would wiſh again to ſee ſo great a proportion of fifteen millions devoted ſolely to Germany, with

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ſcarce a ſingle new regiment, or new fleet of offence, ſent out all the ſummer upon an Engliſh ſervice. If after all this, and the aſſurances that the German army was ninety-five thouſand ſtrong, the French came into the field twenty thouſand men ſuperior to us, when are we to hope to equal them? If France, even in its bankrupt ſtate, can overmatch us, when in the height of our credit, can we aſk a ſtronger proof that this war is a ruinous one? We may value ourſelves upon little trifling advantages, and ſwell as we will, our enemies know that we muſt burſt before we equal them; and will therefore draw out the war to its utmoſt length, till our credit or our patience ſhall be exhauſted.

But in order to give this argument its full force, let us ſuppoſe, that we had more men to enliſt in England than were in France, or that we had more countries to recruit from; and that we could borrow more millions ſtill to pay them; and could, by means of theſe, bring a larger army into the field than the French could oppoſe to us: this is a war which is not only ruinous, but impracticable: it is carrying it on in a method, which can tend to no deciſive iſſue in our favour, nor to any effectual damage to our enemy. 'Tis in a country where a victory can do us no good, and where a defeat can do the French no eſſential hurt. No wiſe government ever thought that the end of making war, was merely the killing of men. Britain ſhould of all others be the moſt tender of riſking the lives of

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its ſubjects upon ſuch a hazard. The great intent of war is by victory to conquer an enemy's country, and by leſſening either his provinces, his ſubjects, or his revenues, to bring him to reaſon. England is morally ſure of effecting this every where elſe; but can hope for nothing of this kind by its war in Germany. Suppoſe us to gain a complete victory; is there any fruit of it to be reaped in Germany? Does Britain propoſe to gain territory or towns in Germany? Would they be worth having, if they were given us? What then is the reward? Inſtead of ſeeing the French upon the Weſer (or that brook the Dimel, to Britiſh ears unnamed before) we ſhould find them upon the Main; that is, at ſo much greater diſtance from England, and ſo much nearer to France; that is, we ſhould have the war to carry on at ſo much greater expence, and have our proviſions, our military ſtores, and our recruits to ſend ſo much the farther; and our enemies would find all their ſupplies ſo much the nearer.

Let us try the chance of war a ſecond time, and if the French are generous enough to give us an open field, (which they certainly won't do, unleſs they are as ſtrong as we) let us fight them over again. If they ſhould beat, all our advanced magazines are loſt: but ſuppoſe us to gain a ſecond victory; what would be the fruit of it? The French may then, perhaps, retreat over the Rhine into their own country. But would any Engliſhman wiſh to fol-

follow them thither? Britain invade France, ſingly; and by its own ſtrength upon the Rhine, among all its frontier towns? The Duke of Marlborough, with the ſingle ſtrength of Britain, would not have done it after the battle of Blenheim. Had he then, or have we now a battering train ſufficient to force regular fortifications? With all the intermediate ſtates of Germany for our enemies, could we ſend them heavy artillery, and that infinite apparatus requiſite for the ſiege of a great town? When we had got it, would we keep it, if we could? Could we keep it if we would? Or rather, long before the neceſſary ſtores could be ſent from hence, or be brought to our army, the French would have drawn troops enough from their great garriſons and frontiers, as well as from their interior militia, to ſurround and cut it off from every poſſibility of return. France now puts not forth half the ſtrength, it would then exert, to deſtroy an Engliſh army, which it ſhould ſee cooped up among the ſtrong towns of its frontiers.

If we are ſo very ſanguine, and think the Britiſh force equal to the whole power of France at land, it were better ſure not to cool the ardour of our troops by marching them five hundred miles into Germany. Inſtead of attacking this Bull by the horns on his German frontier, let us rather gore him in his flank, or pierce him to the heart: Let us give our enemies troops the pain of a long march, and not our own; and land, as our anceſtors did, at

Calais, or Boulogne, or Newhaven, and march to Paris: this will be a much ſhorter, and a much cheaper method of carrying on the war, as well as a much more effectual means of bringing the French to terms. Let us make our enemies country the ſeat of war, rather than our friends, if we really think ourſelves ſtrong enough to cope with their whole land force; and it will be a much eaſier taſk to ſupply our army with artillery and the neceſſary ſtores up the Sein, to take Roan and Paris, than it would be to ſend them over the Maine, the Neckar, and the Rhine, to take Straſburg.

But the abſurdity of England's ever thinking to poſſeſs itſelf of fortified places on the confines between France and Germany, is ſufficient, without mentioning the hazard of ſuch an attempt: allowing it not impoſſible to take a town, it would be abſolutely ſo to know what to do with it. This is a war, therefore, where fortune itſelf cannot help us; we cannot avail ourſelves even of our victories, and the moſt repeated ſucceſs could only multiply our difficulties, and double our charges: that is, it is a method of carrying on a war with France, which from the very nature of it, is impracticable.

If in the preſent courſe of the war, Britain can get nothing by its victories, France, on the other hand, can loſe nothing by a defeat. Except only in the number of the killed and wounded, which in the common courſe of battles, may be ſet at about

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the double of that of the conquerors, what other loſs have our enemies to ſuſtain? *They are driven out of Germany.* Be it ſo: was any one of the towns, which they ſhall quit in their retreat, their's before? Will they have a ſingle fortification the leſs for the greateſt victory we can gain? Or will the French revenue be at all leſſened, or the ſtate brought ſo much the nearer to a bankruptcy, for their having no army to pay out of their own country? *Still*, you'll ſay, *Germany is cleared of them.* True, it may be ſo for the next ſummer, if the French don't chuſe to march thither. But England's expence muſt go on. Our enemies will not tell us, that they don't intend to go thither; they certainly will go, if we attempt to leſſen our expence, and withdraw a great part of our troops. Where then is the end of our labour? Can the French wiſh for a more advantageous plan of carrying on a war, than this; in which they know that no deciſive ſtroke can be ſtruck by us againſt them; and in which they are ſure, that in the long run England muſt be exhauſted, were its treaſures and its credit five times greater than they are?

And can we hope to maintain our conqueſts, by perſiſting in a land war upon ſo diſadvantageous a plan? There are people ſo very inconſiderate, that if we are but fighting with the French, they are content. But ſurely it becomes a wiſe ſtate in making choice of the province, which it ſhall ſend its troops to act in, to conſider, where it can fight to greateſt

advantage; where it can put its enemy to moſt expence, and be itſelf at leaſt; where its enemy is weakeſt, and itſelf ſtrongeſt; where its victories will turn to its own beſt account, and by hurting its adverſary in his moſt eſſential intereſt, reduce him the ſooneſt to ſue for peace. The war in Germany anſwers no one of theſe purpoſes. France cannot be hurt in any material intereſt, but muſt in the end carry its point by ruining our credit. The utmoſt we can propoſe, is only to kill them a few men: and what have we done, even in that reſpect, for theſe four years paſt? Our Britiſh troops never ſaw a General that had ſo large a uſe of them: but France ſcarce knows in its hiſtory ſo innocent a war. Was the battle of Haſtenbeck ſo much in our favour? or their loſs of men there greater than our own? Will ſuch trifling affairs, as thoſe of Crevelt and Warburg, produce any conſequence, except the firing the Tower guns*, and giving a pretence to ſend over more men?

Did we find the French army the weaker laſt ſummer, for thoſe prodigies of valour, ſhewn the year before by two Engliſh brigades at the battle of Minden? Let the General have done his duty, and brought up the horſe, as he ought, to charge the French, or trample down three or four thouſand Saxon and French foot. It would doubtleſs have been a very good thing: that might have

* Fifteen Millions ſpent, and fifteen hundred enemies killed: is it not doing Frenchmen's heads too much honour, to fire guns of triumph upon ſuch an occaſion, and ſhew that we value them at ten thouſand pounds a ſcalp?

more than doubled the number, which the French really loſt there, and would have made the victory more brilliant. But where would have been the ſubſtantial benefit to England? How would the main of the war have been affected by it? The French army perhaps might not have been able to make a ſtand quite ſo ſoon; and might have croſſed the Main; and the Engliſh might have entered Frankfort. And is Frankfort worth to England the taking a French cock boat? Was it before a French town, or will it after be an Engliſh one? The only loſs therefore would have been of men. But France cannot be hurt by the mere loſs of men, which, were it five times greater, it could preſently ſupply, by draughts from its militia; or replace when it pleaſed, with recruits in Germany. But is our ſtate ſo large? or are our huſbandmen and manufacturers ſo very uſeleſs to it? as to juſtify the pitting five and twenty thouſand Engliſhmen, againſt thirty or forty thouſand French, merely to try their valour, and which ſhall kill the moſt men; with a bett of at leaſt five millions to three depending upon the main! And all this, without the poſſibility of any one national advantage accruing from the victory?

The diſtinguiſhing art of this war has hitherto conſiſted in the raiſing trifling ſkirmiſhes into battles, and victories. We overlook the ruining our troops, in the praiſes of their valour; and there are who knew, that they could not make their court in any method ſo effectually, as by magnifying the victories

tories of our German army, and aggravating the loſſes of the French. But with all their loſſes, the French have been every year ſtronger in Germany than we: as much ſtronger as in good policy they ought to be. In reality, I fear we muſt be much miſtaken, if we think that France is but juſt ſuperior to us. Could France furniſh out armies upon the Rhine, the Moſelle, and the Maeſe, with two more in Spain, and Savoy, all at the ſame time; and can we flatter ourſelves that all its reſources are now exhauſted by ſending one ſingle army to invade Hanover?

Do we not now ſee the French court making diſpoſitions for a ſecond army? and have we not already felt the effects of it? What then was the foundation of thoſe vain boaſts, which are given out every ſeſſion; that the French are ruined; and the next campaign muſt be their laſt *? Far from being bankrupt by maintaining their ground all the ſummer in Heſſe, with an army ſuperior to ours, their government now finds itſelf in a capacity to form two armies; and muſt we not therefore have taken a wrong meaſure of their ſtrength, when we repreſented their finances as unequal to the expence of one?

* "France is ſinking; ſhe knows herſelf ſinking: this is "only the laſt effort of a dying power: 'tis the effort of de- "ſpair. Let us but reſiſt it firmly, and we need not fear any "thing, which ſhe can do from deſpair.

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We have before ſeen the impracticableneſs of making war with France on the Upper Rhine? ſhall we now then march to the Lower Rhine? To what purpoſe? *To take Weſel.* That is not the French frontier, but the King of Pruſſia's. *But we would prevent the French from forming an army there.* The want of Weſel did not prevent the French from reſolving to march their army that way in the year 1757, and neither would it now. In order to effect that therefore, we muſt form a greater army there ourſelves, elſe we may be repulſed and beaten back. But ſuppoſe we could prevent the French from forming their army upon the Lower Rhine; they would then order it upon the Roer or the Maeſe: and is it a matter of the leaſt conſequence to them, where it is formed, if we do but go after it? The French cannot propoſe to conquer England by ſending armies into Germany: their only hope is to exhauſt and weary us out by a land war, which we muſt carry on with them upon ſuch very diſadvantageous terms; and to divert us from their iſlands, by employing our attention in Germany. They have found that the miſtaken zeal of the nation, and our eagerneſs to fight a Frenchman any were, have made us willing to meet them on the ground of their own chuſing with one army, and they are now trying to decoy us with another. And were that ſecond army to be on the Maeſe, it would anſwer their intention better than one on the Lower Rhine; becauſe their troops would be ſo much the nearer home: And if the nation be obſti-

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nate, and our credit will not break ſooner, rather than not exhauſt us, they will trail us on with a third army on the Moſelle, or on any other part of their frontiers which we ſhall chooſe *.

But let us ſuppoſe the nation to be powerful and zealous enough to raiſe twenty millions, and that, with the other five, we could draw down good troops for another army, I had almoſt ſaid, out of the moon: for upon this earth I have ſhewn they are not to be had. Go on thus for three campaigns more, and kill 20,000 French in each, till not a

* A young Prince of ſpirit, who has diſtinguiſhed himſelf in a ſecond character, may think it time to have a command in chief. Could he have had the good fortune to have killed fifte en hundred Frenchmen, it would have been about the ſize of our former victories; and under the noiſe of ſuch a triumph, he might have gained another eſtabliſhment, and a reſolution to form an army for him. The novelty of a foreign general is now over. But ſurely it will not be eaſy to ſhew how Britain could have been in the leaſt benefited by having two ſuch Generals; and two armies, (if it could have found men) inſtead of one; and at leaſt two more millions of its treaſure to be ſpent in Germany on the ſupport of them; and all this expence incurred for the ſake of regaining Weſel for an ally, which he himſelf had magnanimouſly abandoned, when the works of it were intire, and would not defend, either for his own ſake or ours. While with half the treaſure, and half the number of troops, which are ſent to Germany, to ſerve no one Engliſh or good German purpoſe, we might poſſeſs ourſelves of the French iſlands, which they could never retake from us: and by perpetuating our conqueſts, gain to his Majeſty a hundred thouſand ſubjects, and to the nation an increaſed annual income of four or five millions: Beſides ſecuring Hanover, and putting an end to the expence and ſlaughter of the war, when we pleaſed.

battalion

battalion remained on the right of the Rhine from Baſil to Emerick. Still we ſhould find ourſelves as far from peace as ever. We might the next campaign be ſtronger in the field than France. But how ſhould we avail ourſelves of this ſuperiority? What would be the advantage of it? None. The court of France would know of that ſuperiority; and would order their army not to march that year into Germany, and would anſwer their purpoſe juſt as well, by having put us to twenty millions expence, while they were at none: and by having kept their troops and their money at home, would have ſo much the better a fund, for the next year's war, when England would be exhauſted. In ſhort, this is a war, which France never can be hurt by, and never can be weary of. A land war with England alone is an advantage, and which France has not enjoyed theſe hunded years. 'Tis the triumph, and not the trial of their arms to fight us ſingle in Germany *; and if they know their own intereſt, they will never ſend an over-powerful army thither to drive us out of it, and put us upon bethinking ourſelves of ours.

But when we had beat the French out of Germany, we would go and aſſiſt the King of Pruſſia. Againſt whom? *The army of the Empire?* Britain has no quarrel with the Empire of its own; and it has

* It will not be a juſtification of this part of the war, to ſay that we have had great ſucceſs elſewhere; becauſe I ſhall hereafter ſhew that the war in Germany has not in the leaſt degree contributed to our ſucceſſes in any other part of the world.

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been already ſhewn, that it never can be the intereſt of Britain to abet the quarrels of the members of the Empire againſt each other. Can we give to France a greater pleaſure than to ſee us, their declared enemy, employed in a war with the Empire, their moſt dangerous rival? *Shall we then attack the Auſtrian army?* The Empreſs Queen is not at war with us. And has not Britain enemies enough already, without going into Eaſt Germany to ſeek for more? *But they are all enemies of the King of Pruſſia.* And are we ſubjects of the King of Pruſſia? *He is our ally.* By a treaty which does not oblige us to ſend a man into Germany. *We guarantied Sileſia.* In the ſame terms as he did Hanover, which he was going to attack. *But he needs our aſſiſtance.* Are then the Britiſh troops never to ſee an end of their labours? Are our men and treaſures ſo very numerous, that we ſhould ſend our ſubjects to ſeek out Bohemians, Hungarians, Boſnians and Sclavonians, Bannatines, and Waraſdiners, and twenty other people of the Eaſt, with whom we never had the leaſt concern? Are we ſure that we can conquer Auſtrians, Ruſſians and Swedes, all in one ſummer ſo entirely, as that his Majeſty of Pruſſia may not need our aſſiſtance the next ſummer, when the French will invade the Electorate with freſh force? If we ſhould help him to conquer all his enemies, is it certain that he would be the better friend to us for his not needing our aſſiſtance? Are we ſure that the price of his friendſhip would not riſe with the importance of it? Is it certain that he would return our kindneſs, and help us againſt the French? Let us at leaſt

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have a treaty to oblige him to it; and not truſt it, as it now is, merely to his gratitude. Did he not in the laſt war quit the French, who were his makers, as ſoon as he no longer wanted them? Theſe and a thouſand other queſtions ought to be anſwered, before we reſolve on ſending our army into Eaſt Germany. We once profeſſed never to truſt our troops beyond the mouths of the great rivers of the Ems and Weſer: but whither are they to go, that are to fight the king of Pruſſia's battles? If our army is to go ſo far into the inland parts of Germany, how is it to act? *Shall it join the king of Pruſſia?* And are Britons then to be given up to fight, not only under a foreign general, but under a foreign king too? He will probably uſe them ſoon, knowing that they will ſoon be weary of being ſo uſed. *Shall they then act by themſelves?* Where are their magazines? Shall they follow them too from Embden to Breſlau? If the nation is now brought a million and a half in debt for the article of forage, how many millions will ſupply us at that diſtance? Not to aſk how Engliſhmen are to find their way back, if they ſhould be expoſed and routed; let us ſuppoſe him and them to be victorious, and to oblige his enemies to treat with him; and let us ſuppoſe this German prince to be a more faithful and more grateful ally than any other German prince ever was to us; and that he would really aſſiſt us againſt France, What could he do for us? *He might join our army, and beat the French out of Hanover.* Be it ſo. Still Britain muſt be at the expence, and ſtill keep up an army there, and our

ſubſidies muſt ſtill go on. Probably his would riſe upon it, and he might then inſiſt upon a million. Has he not without this been attempting an increaſe already ?

But let his ſubſidy remain the ſame, and let the French be driven out of Germany; What advantage would Britain receive thereby? *Why when the French could no longer come into Hanover and make war with us, they muſt make peace.* Nothing leſs. So long as we could keep his Majeſty of Pruſſia in humour, and he ſhould find himſelf at leiſure to guard us, the French may ceaſe to invade the electorate. But why ſhould that oblige them to ſue for peace? Is the French government at an end, when they have no longer an army in Germany? Will their provinces, their people, or their revenues be the leſs, for their armies not croſſing the Rhine? The Hanoverians, if the Pruſſians and they agree together, may be at reſt for a ſummer; but why ſhould the French cry out for peace, when nobody hurts them? Surely, it is not enough that they do not hurt us; we muſt hurt them before they will ſue for peace. For that then we muſt attack them in their iſlands, and take from them all they have left: that will drive them to a peace, or pay us the annual expence of a naval war. If then we muſt recur at laſt to our fleet, and make the peace for ourſelves; why take ſo immenſely wide a circuit, to come at a point which lies ſtraight before us? Why run the nation thirty millions more in debt, to

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do that two or three years hence, which might have been done laſt winter, or this; by which we might have ſecured a peace and indemnification for Hanover at the French expence; and by which, now that North America is ours, we ſhall have it in our own power to put an end to the war, as well as perpetuate our conqueſts, whether the French chuſe it or not: no matter whether they will treat with us; from that time they cannot have a ſhip at ſea, nor a poſſibility of coming at us. The channel and our fleet would keep the peace; we ſhould not want to get any thing from them; and they would not be able to get any thing from us.

Many of my readers might think it unneceſſary to purſue this argument any further; but ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed as the nation has been, there is no end of raiſing ſuppoſitions in favour of this king of Pruſſia. I have heard it ſaid, that *he would make the Empreſs Queen make it a condition in her peace with him, that ſhe ſhould join her forces to his, and aſſiſt us againſt France.* But we muſt have helped him to beat her five times ſucceſſively, before ſhe could conſent to fight againſt her ally: whereas hitherto, he has been nearly as often beaten as victorious. But be it ſo, let them both come to our aid. We ſhall then have two armies in Hanover: a Pruſſian and an Auſtrian army: Hanoverian auxiliaries in Britiſh pay. The poor Hanoverians, I am afraid, would not thank us for bringing two ſuch different kinds of gueſts into their country. Perhaps

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they would as ſoon chuſe to ſee the French there, as a Pruſſian army and an Auſtrian.

Let them then go out of it, and both, in conjunction with the Engliſh army, march and attack the French upon the Rhine. Still we are not upon ſo good a plan as the old Revolution ſyſtem, when the Germans had three armies invading France upon their own account, and in their own pay. *Let us ſuppoſe them then to be generous enough to fight the French upon their own pay, and that the Empire and the Dutch would join them, and all declare war againſt France.* Should we not then wiſh all that flower of the German youth, thoſe hundred thouſands, which the French, for theſe four years paſt, have with pleaſure ſeen cutting each others throats, ſhould we not then, I ſay, wiſh them all alive again to ſtrengthen our battalions, and thicken our ſquadrons in the common cauſe? And is not this the very poſition, which we ſet out with in theſe Conſiderations; that it was the French intereſt, and not the Engliſh, which was ſerved by civil wars in Germany? And thus, after having granted every thing on this head which the fondeſt preſumption could have aſked; after having endleſly heaped up ſuppoſitions upon each other to ſerve the preſent ſyſtem, and made the greateſt improbabilities concur to favour it, we ſhould, after all, be brought, two or three years hence, to that ſtate of Europe, which in former wars we ſat out in; with this ſtill remaining difference, of England's being exhauſted of its treaſures, and Germany of its troops.

troops. So much better things were the old grand alliances, than the new continental connections.

In ſhort, if we are to perſiſt in this ruinous and impracticable German war, let the wealth and power of the nation be as great as they will, it is England and not France which muſt ſue for a peace. Whatever be our ſucceſſes there, France is untouched; whenever the French government knows that they can ſend thither an army ſuperior to ours, they will attack us; whenever we are too ſtrong for them, they will not ſend: But, far from being ruined by the intermiſſion of a ſingle campaign in Germany, they are thereby only made the ſtronger for the next. Why then ſhould France ſue for peace, when at worſt they have only to ſtand ſtill, and keep their money at home, and their troops upon their frontiers, holding the appearance of marching into Germany, and our ruin is compleated: for we muſt be at ſtill the ſame expence; and after having got ſix and thirty millions in debt, muſt go on to eight and forty.

But we have been ſo long talking of the magnanimity of our ally, that many perſons will not give up their opinion of his ability to ſerve us. He has been called the magnanimous by too great an authority to admit a doubt of his having it in his power to do great things for us. For the ſake of ſuch perſons, it may be of uſe to think of his *will*: and reflect a little on what foundation that general

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perſuaſion reſts, of his being ſo much our friend; or how far we can determine whether he is moſt inclined to do us good or hurt. The entering into this conſideration will be an apology to the reader for having preſumed to differ ſo much from the received opinion; and as what I have to offer will chiefly conſiſt of reminding him of paſt facts, he will himſelf judge of their conſequences.

One of the inconveniencies, neceſſarily ariſing out of the number of our preſent news-writers, is their being all of them obliged to aim at popularity. Hence whatever happens to be the prevailing opinion of the time, theſe are vying with each other, which ſhall ſay moſt in favour of that opinion; and carry the concluſions drawn from it to the greateſt height. And as at leaſt ninety nine hundredth parts of the people take their opinions from the papers, every thing is hereby run to exceſs. Wiſe men repeat what weaker men write, not thinking themſelves concerned to exerciſe their judgment, about matters derived from ſo ſlight an authority; but they are heard as their own, and thereby acquire the ſtrongeſt authority. Great men in their country retirements talk the news in common converſation, not as really matter of their opinion, but merely to find chat for their country viſiters; fools repeat this after them, with the addition of Such a great man told me: and thus by the ſeaſon when gentlemen come to town, theſe crude fancies are ripened up for them; and ſeriouſly repreſented as the ſenſe of the nation.

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Let any man recollect the ſeveral violent prejudices, which the kingdom has run into, and he will find moſt of them derived from this ſource. Not to go ſo far back as the laſt war, when the magnanimity of the Queen of Hungary, and the perfidiouſneſs of the K. of P——, were the favourite topicks; let him think only how the preſent war opened with the moſt violent encomiums on the bravery and good conduct of General Blakeney. Not a day paſt for three months together, without our reading ſome article or other in his favour. And all theſe things were affirmed, and received for true, during a time, when from the very circumſtances of the ſiege and the iſland, every man might have known, that no one could have received a ſingle line from him or the garriſon; and when, for any thing theſe writers could tell, this old gentleman might have been dead a fortnight before the ſiege of St. Philips began. Yet what was ſaid by the news-writers upon ſo ſlight a foundation, was repeated by gentlemen in the country; and by winter when they came to parliament, this was conſidered as the ſenſe of the nation, and he was made a lord upon the credit of it. After him the K. of P——— became the favourite of theſe authors. Had he done any thing for Britain? Had he in his former life ever ſhewn the leaſt favourable diſpoſition to us? Had we not long been condemning him as ſerving the cauſe of France, raiſing a civil war in the empire, and embroiling our allies, and making the moſt ſolemn treaties give way to his ambition? Did we not think him at

leaſt capable of penning memorials, which were appeals to the people againſt our government, and keeping a miniſter here to converſe among our merchants, and ſpread theſe ſeeds of diſaffection? Did he not appear to us as a prince, who in the mere wantonneſs of malice, was braving the nation's honour at ſea; ſpeaking in the moſt diſreſpectful terms of our late gracious ſovereign at his own court; and inſulting him at others by ſending one of our rebels for an ambaſſador? Had we not condemned him as breaking again the faith of treaties, and even after he had gotten all he claimed in Sileſia, attacking our allies afreſh, to ſave our enemies the French?

We ſet out in the preſent war with the ſame opinion of him, and the firſt ſcene of it was to have been opened with ſuch a determined act of hoſtility as princes do not often forgive. We knew the court of Ruſſia's diſpoſition to attack him, and gave 500,000 pounds for 55,000 Ruſſians to make a diverſion, which was ſeemingly to eat him up. Soldiers are apt enough to riot in their hoſtilities, when in an enemy's country, and Ruſſian ſoldiers were not then known to be more gentle ravagers than Germans: but it was determined by the expreſs articles of this treaty, that they ſhould have all the plunder; and that they might be ſure to take enough, we were to allow them nothing elſe to live upon: whatever be the licence of war, ſuch things do not ordinarily make the articles of a treaty.

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Conſidering it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was much cheaper than any we have made ſince; being at the rate of leſs than one fourth of the price, which we pay for Heſſians*. It was for 40,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry to be kept in

* We have already mentioned the pay of the year 1759: but the ſeveral articles of our German expence have been ſo carefully concealed, that there is no making up the account of a campaign, till the end of the following ſeſſions. By the reſolutions of the 27th of November, and 20th of December, it appears, that we paid to the Landgrave 426,725 l. for 19,012 men. The Hanoverians for nearly the ſame ſum (447,882 l.) furniſhed us with more than double that number (38,750 men). The price of 55,000 Ruſſians (excluſive of any allowance for the galleys and greater proportion of Horſe) would at the ſame rate amount to 1,230,000 l. ſo much more temperate are Hanoverians than Heſſians, and Ruſſians than either of them. Theſe laſt were to have maintained themſelves, not only in their own country, but when they marched out of it: but our German friends expect that we ſhould feed them at their own homes; and, by an article, lucrative enough for mercenaries, but unknown among allies, have learned to double their demands upon us for forage and extraordinaries. Should the reader ſtill wonder at the diſproportion of theſe ſums, he will recollect that very ſingular one of ſixty thouſand pounds, which in the affluence of our millions, was given, *in order to facilitate the means, by which the moſt ſerene Landgrave may again fix his reſidence in his own dominions; and give freſh courage to his faithful ſubjects by his preſence, which is ſo much wiſhed for.* Whatever may have been our compaſſion the former year, for an old gentleman returning from Hamburgh to his own houſe; men muſt have winked extremely hard on theſe fine words, to renew the grant a ſecond time, when the old Landgrave's reſidence was already fixed, or rather he was dying at Rintelen; and when his ſon, being a new converted papiſt, might not have his preſence ſo much wiſh'd for by his more faithful proteſtant ſubjects.

Livonia, adjoining to Lithuania; and there to remain till they ſhould be wanted; with 40 or 50 galleys. Thirty thouſand of this infantry, and the fifteen thouſand horſe were to march, if his Majeſty's German dominions ſhould be attacked, in order to make a diverſion; and the other ten thouſand infantry were to be embarked on board the gallies, in order to make a deſcent. For this England was to pay the Ruſſians one hundred thouſand pounds while their troops remained in Livonia, and four hundred thouſand more, as ſoon as, in conſequence of the requiſition, they ſhould have paſſed the frontiers of their country: and the king of England engaged to procure for them a paſſage through Poland.

By article the 11th, *All the plunder, which the Ruſſian troops ſhall gain from the enemy, of what nature and quality ſoever, ſhall be for the advantage of thoſe ſame troops.*

Art. 7th. *Whereas her Imperial Majeſty is particularly intereſted in the tranquility of the North, and conſidering alſo the proximity of the countries, wherein the diverſion in queſtion will probably be made, and the facility her troops will have of ſubſiſting immediately in an enemy's country; ſhe takes upon herſelf alone, during ſuch a diverſion, the ſubſiſtence and treatment of the ſaid troops by ſea and land; as alſo the heavy artillery, which they may have occaſion for, and of the details thereunto belonging.* Signed at Peterſburgh. 30th Sept. 1755.

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The dread of theſe gueſts diverted his Pruſſian Majeſty from his intended attack upon the Electoral dominions, and brought him three months after to ſign the treaty of Weſtminſter; ſolely to keep all foreign troops out of the Empire, with a direct view to the Ruſſians on our ſide, and the French on his.

We thought he might keep it; and diſguſted the Ruſſians for his ſake. —— From this time he no longer bore the harder titles we had been uſed to give him, and we inſtantly turned round in our opinion. He was the hero of the age, the protector of the German liberties, and the champion of Proteſtantiſm. He was in England, our ſecond King and defender of our faith. Even thoſe men, whoſe principles had kept them, during the foregoing part of their lives, repining at one German King, now drank the health of our two kings, as cordially as if they had been born at Berlin. Illuminations were made in our ſtreets for this new king's birth-day; and I think, like the mighty Mr. Vernon, he had two rejoicing nights in about a fortnight. Every thing then became Pruſſian. We had Pruſſian caps to make our ladies look fine, and Pruſſian croſs-bones to ſhew their men the more frightful; and which was more than both, we had Pruſſian ale for the mob to get drunk with. Let any one then have tried to inſert an article in a news-paper, which ſhould have tended in the leaſt degree to moderate this exceſſive regard to him; or which implied any doubt

doubt either of the good faith, the religion, or the wiſdom of this favourite, in making all Europe his enemies, it would not have been received; the proprietors would have objected, that ſuch an article would make their paper unpopular, and would upon no terms have been brought to print it.

'Tis a melancholy truth, and not much for the honour of our national gratitude; but this prince, whom we had never thought our friend, and who, we had been uſed to think (I don't ſay rightly) had ſhewn in his actions a neglect of all moral obligation, and in his writings a contempt of every religious principle, became at once the ſtandard of all excellence in war and politics; and has retained his popularity with us for a much longer term, than our great and good King William could hold it, with all the merit of having been the ſaviour of Holland, of Britain, and of Europe.

He is now called our ally; and there is a reverence due to that title: and therefore none of the hard things, we uſed to ſay of him, are now true: but any intelligent man, who ſhall recollect what we had been doing at the court of St. Peterſburgh, and the evident tendency of the Ruſſian treaty, will find it very hard to perſuade himſelf, that he can ever forget it; or that three months after, when the treaty of Weſtminſter was made, any two courts in Europe ſtood leſs cordially affected to each other, than thoſe of London and Berlin.

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The thoughtleſs mob may be inſtantaneouſly converted in his favour; eſpecially as he is a warrior, and fights a great many battles; and the news writers, who pay their whole court to the popular opinion, would ſoon aſcribe to him all other excellencies. But the reader, who conſiders how the electoral houſes muſt have regarded each other at the ſigning the treaty of Peterſburgh, will not help putting the queſtion to himſelf: Can then ſuch fervent love ſhoot up in the breaſts of princes in three months time only, out of deadly hatred? Do the reſentments even of private men ſubſide ſo ſoon, after the moſt premeditated rancour? The operations of fear may be inſtantaneous: but love and friendſhip are plants of a ſlower growth. The one might fear for Hanover, and the other for Pruſſia; and both might thereby be brought to ſuſpend their hatred; and after that they would certainly talk in terms of the moſt cordial affection and confidence, were it only to conceal their mutual diſtruſts. But if the conditions of our future peace with France are to depend upon his favour, we can ſurely hope for very little aſſiſtance from the friendſhip of a man, who may think that we have given him ſo inexpiable a cauſe of hatred.

Should the reader have any doubts about the juſtneſs of this reaſoning, let him try it by experiment. This treaty of Weſtminſter conſiſted but of one article, and ſolely regarded the keeping of all foreign troops out of the empire. What was the effect?

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We obſerved our part of the treaty, and kept out the Ruſſians; but he might think, notwithſtanding our ſervile profeſſions of eſteem of him, that the ſureſt hold he had of us, were our fears; and therefore having obtained his own purpoſe to keep out the Ruſſians, he withdrew his garriſon from Weſel, which his father had been at an infinite expence in fortifying, and let in the French. He knew how much our dread of him would make us bear, and we knew that he could at any time join with his ſure friends the French; and therefore Britain, far from reſenting any breach of a former treaty, ſubmitted to make another with him, in which we ſeem humbly to deprecate his forſaking us, and offer up our four millions of crowns to buy our ſecurity. The reader will find this treaty at the end, and may try if he can make any thing more of it.

But may we not hope from his gratitude for his aſſiſtance in our future peace, after having ſo largely aſſiſted him in his wars? Have then the houſe of Auſtria's returns for our having ſo long ſupported them, and ſpent ſo many millions in their ſervice, been ſuch as to admit of our hoping any thing from the gratitude of German courts? Will any Prince in Germany once think of our money the moment after it is ſpent? What were the returns, which this very Prince in the laſt war rendered to the French, who were his makers? As ſoon as his own purpoſe was ſerved, and he had got what he wanted, he left them, and entered into a treaty with the Queen of Hungary.

Hungary. He afterwards broke it indeed, and when this nation was rejoicing at Prince Charles's having paſſed the Rhine, fell upon the Queen of Hungary in time of full peace, to bring him back again, and prevent our ally from growing too great. Does he not now know, whether we chuſe to ſee it or not, that he has owed all his importance to the cunning of his management between the French and us? And is it not the uſual policy of men in ſuch circumſtances to ſecure their enemies, as ſoon as they have wearied their friends? Have we then any hope but that, ſhould he have the preſcribing the terms of our peace at the end of the war, his great object will be to make the French nation his friends, after having gotten all he can out of the Engliſh?

Such are like to be the effects of this nation's exhauſting itſelf to raiſe him, and making the conditions of our future peace depend upon his pleaſure, inſtead of our own. Will he then think it for his intereſt to ſuffer his firſt and natural allies, the French, to be ſtript of their ſettlements, and Britain made ſo ſtrong as to be independent on him, and all other petty German connections, from whence only he can derive his greatneſs? Too long have theſe German Princes, though not their people, found the ſweets of thoſe conteſts between the French and Us, in which we have been courting them for their troops; for any one of them to wiſh to ſee Britain gain ſuch an aſcendency by a future peace,

as would at once put an end to their gainful importance.

And what is the merit, he may then aſk us, by which we can pretend to have obliged his gratitude? The Engliſh nation, which is receiving nothing for the money we annually pay him, may think that he is obliged to us for it. But he may conſider it in a very different light; he may perhaps tell us, that we have had our million's worth for our million; that he received our money as the purchaſe of an immunity for Weſtern Germany; and that ſo long as we continue to pay it, and he confines his ravages to the Eaſt, he fully diſcharges every obligation he is under.

His power over us is now, I hope, come to an end: but ſhould we go on, ſupporting and raiſing him up to be the arbiter of Germany, what part would be exempt from the effects of it? Will then that favoured land, which we have ſo long moved heaven and earth in defence of; by which the French have, in two ſucceeding wars, artfully laid upon us the burden of bribing one half of Germany, and fighting the other: will this devoted Electorate at laſt eſcape him? His demands will riſe with his greatneſs, and the time muſt come when our money or our patience will be exhauſted: ſooner or later he will be wanting ſomething more of us than we ſhall be able to pay for its immunity. Will then the prey, which he has ſo long watched for, appear

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the leſs inviting, for Britain's being obliged to give up the protection of it? Or will the morſel be the leſs delicious, for our having ſpent there ſo many millions in the defence of it?

But the honour of the nation is now concerned, and we ought ſacredly to fulfil our engagements. Without doubt we ought, if thoſe engagements themſelves are honourable. Whether ours be ſo or not, the reader will himſelf judge, by turning to the treaty· and will ſee that we have now an opportunity of deciding this queſtion by experiment.

The ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pound, which by the firſt article we are to give to our ally, is either the payment of fear, to buy off the evil of ſuffering; or it is the purchaſe of good, to procure the benefit of aſſiſtance. If this be the payment of fear, then the firſt and the ſecond article too, which in an equal treaty ſhould reſpect the two different parties, will be both in his favour. He will have the money on demand, imploy the troops raiſed with it as he pleaſes, and call his own intereſt the *common cauſe*. That is, the money paid him, is a ſtrict and proper tribute. And the honour of Britain therefore, far from being bound to continue tributary, is concerned to break looſe from this ſtate of ſubjection as ſoon as poſſible.

If it be ſaid, that this is not the payment of fear, but the purchaſe of good; then the interpretation

of the ſecond article is ours. We have the right of judging what is the *common cauſe*, and where the troops raiſed with our money ſhall be imployed to ſerve it. Make the experiment then by a requiſition of fifty thouſand men to be ſent to Hanover for our aſſiſtance. If our ally perform his part of the treaty, the honour of the nation may then be engaged to adhere to it; if he refuſe to comply with the obligation of his part of the treaty, the honour of the nation is then concerned immediately to declare it void. *

But that great queſtion, which has been ſo long agitated, whether Britain ought to have any continental connections, has now been determined, and all parties happily agree, that it muſt have its continental connections.

* There is but one way of evading the force of this dilemma, (which the Author would not have mentioned, if his anſwerers had not taken refuge in it) and that is by alledging, that this is not a payment of fear, or of purchaſe; but a gift of friendſhip. If it be ſuch, then a foreign prince will very little deſerve our money, if he does not acknowledge that the nation has been already very honourable to him; and that our kindneſs, renewed only from year to year, gives him no claim of obligation on us for the future. And every other nation, and perhaps a future parliament may tell us, that at a time, when *the nation was crouching under a load of ſo many more than a hundred millions old debt*, and contracting twelve more of new, our honour was much more concerned to begin our charity at home, and keep our money to be applied where it is moſt wanted, in our own ſervice. And then poſſibly it may appear, that the honour of the public may be nothing more than the obſtinacy of a few, who having once unhappily miſtaken their courſe, may think it more for their honour to perſiſt in a wrong one, than go back to take the right.

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As this is the firſt time theſe terms have been heard of in a political debate, and their author did not explain his meaning in them, it will be neceſſary for the reader, before he can form any judgment on the ſubject, to ſettle in his own mind, what he is to underſtand by them. A continental connection may mean, either a connection with the whole continent of Europe, or with a part of it; it may mean a connection with a very large part, or a very ſmall part. The grand alliance, formed by King William, between England and all the other ſtates of Europe againſt France, was a continental connection: a treaty with any German Prince for a body of troops, as with a Prince of Buckbug for a regiment of artillery, is a continental connection. Is it poſſible for us to form any judgment upon a propoſition, which is expreſſed in terms ſo very vague and indefinite? Two things then occur in the beginning of this diſcuſſion. The one is, that this great queſtion, ſaid to have been ſo long agitated, and now determined, never was a queſtion before; becauſe the terms of it were never before put into a propoſition, from the Conqueſt to this time: the other is, that it never can be a queſtion; becauſe the terms of it are ſo very vague and general, as to have no determinate meaning in them, and preciſely to expreſs nothing at all.

However, as the ſubject requires our conſideration, the only fair way which I know of treating on it, is by an induction of the ſeveral particular ſenſes, in which the propoſition may be underſtood, and weighing the merits of each.

If the terms be underſtood in their moſt general ſenſe, and the queſtion be, whether Britain ought at any time, or in any caſe whatſoever, to have any ſort of connection with the whole, or any part of the continent of Europe? This ſeems to be a queſtion too general to be ever agitated at all; becauſe it is impoſſible for any man to ſay, that there may not ariſe ſome certain occaſions and circumſtances of affairs, which may unavoidably force us to have ſome connection with the continent: at leaſt, this queſtion cannot have been agitated ſince the act of ſettlement, becauſe that was itſelf a continental connection, and a very happy one, though intended perhaps to be not quite ſo great an one. The fetching a future Queen from the continent, which good Engliſhmen may wiſh perhaps might for this time not be from Germany, would be a continental connection. If therefore the terms of this queſtion are underſtood in their utmoſt latitude, it cannot have been agitated ſince the act of ſettlement. But whether the queſtion was determined then, or has been more happily ſettled now, we ſhall gain very little knowledge by the deciſion: for becauſe it is allowed, that there may poſſibly be a caſe, wherein Britain's having a continental connection may not be wrong, it will by no means follow, that every continental connection which it ſhall enter into, muſt therefore be right: elſe we muſt read our logic backwards, and ſay, *Omne minus includit majus.* In order to ſpeak definitively, therefore, and bring the queſtion to an iſſue, we muſt fairly ſay what is the particular continental connection which we intend.

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A continental connection, then, in the next place, may mean a connection with the whole continent, or with a part of it. A connection with the whole cannot be the ſenſe meant, becauſe the whole continent of Europe never was connected againſt any other part of the world; at leaſt ſince the wars for the Holy Land. Or if it were, Britain's being in amity with, or equally well affected towards every nation in Europe, though a very good moral virtue, which I could heartily wiſh we had a great deal more of, yet politically expreſſes nothing: becauſe ſuch an equal connection with all the nations of Europe is, as to all the operating effects of it in war and peace, the very ſame thing as the having no connection with any of them. Beſide that the ſubject under conſideration was war, which in the very idea of it, excludes that of a general amity.

Britain's continental connections therefore, muſt be with a part of Europe; and if ſo, they muſt either be with a greater part of it, or a ſmall part of it. If our connections are to be with the greater part of the continent, then in order to make the propoſition applicable to the preſent caſe, the reader will find himſelf under a neceſſity of ſubjoining a farther queſtion: Whether Britain's continental connections are to be connections of friendſhip, or connections of enmity? for the ſeveral great powers of Europe, which uſed to be our allies, we have no connections of friendſhip with any one of them. Neither Holland nor Denmark will have any connection with us; and the Empreſs and Empire of Germany, and Ruſ-

ſia,

ſia, and Sweden, are in conjunction with the French our enemies. If therefore continental connections mean connections with the great powers of Europe, they muſt mean connections of enmity: for of friendſhip with us they have none. All the connections therefore which we can have at preſent with theſe, muſt, I fear, be at the muzzles of our muſquets.

Where then are our continental connections? An Elector of Brandenburgh, in conſideration of the yearly ſum of ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds, is content not to hurt another Electorate; and Britain for the defence of it, has an alliance with the continent of Heſſe. It could get no other connection; it muſt have ſome connection; and therefore took up with that: which is the laſt and only ſenſe, which the propoſition, that Britain muſt have its continental connections, can be underſtood in, to be a juſtification of the preſent German war.

Does then the propoſition mean, that Britain ought always to have ſome continental connections or other; and that therefore, if one part of the continent refuſe to accept of any connections with it, ſtill it muſt have them, and muſt therefore ſeek them in another? For a moment let us lament the fate of our iſland, that having ſo long remained above water, it muſt now ſink, unleſs chained and moored by ſome connection to the continent: and then aſk whether the propoſition in this ſenſe does not prove rather too much. For if we adopt this new doctrine, that it is abſolutely neceſſary for Britain to have

have ſome continental connection, it will thence follow, that if the part of Europe, which has the right on its ſide, will not accept of our connections, we muſt then make them with thoſe that are in the wrong: if the party, which is the ſtrongeſt, will not be connected with us, we muſt then connect ourſelves with the weakeſt. I will not preſume to arraign the juſtice of my country, ſo far as to ſuppoſe that the former has been our caſe: indeed it cannot always have been ſo, becauſe Britain has actually been in this war connected on both ſides: but [a] debt of eight and thirty millions, contracted ſince theſe laſt continental connections, will long remain a very feeling conviction of our having taken the weaker ſide againſt the ſtronger.

But not to loſe ſight of our ſubject in this ſmoke-ball of a pompous phraſe: the great queſtion, which has really been agitated from the revolution to this day; and the only one, in which England is concerned, is, How far it ought to unite itſelf in alliances of war upon the continent? And the reader muſt have obſerved, that the whole tendency of theſe Conſiderations has been to eſtabliſh, and bring us back to the true revolution ſyſtem: that the only enemy upon the continent, which Britain can be indangered by, is France: that whenever the other nations of Europe will unite in an effectual alliance of war againſt France, it will then be the intereſt of England to join in that alliance: but that in every divided ſtate of Europe, and much more in every divided ſtate of the German Princes with each other, it muſt, if the fore-

going principles are true, invariably be the intereſt of Britain never to concern itſelf with them ; at leaſt farther than by offering its mediation to compoſe them : that the French nation's having taken one ſide of a German conteſt, is ſo far from being a juſt motive for England's taking the other, that for that very reaſon we ought ſo much the more to keep out of it.

This is the principle, which actuated our greateſt ſtateſmen, for the firſt twenty years after the Revolution ; and this was the ſole principle, by which one of the beſt politicians, that ever ſat on the Engliſh throne, governed himſelf through his whole reign. 'Twas the forming that grand alliance, which, after having firſt been the ſaviour of his own country, and then of Britain, completed his character, and made him the deliverer of Europe. And nothing but that alliance could have broke the chains, which France was then preparing for it. Had King William, when he came to the crown of England, inſtead of ſetting himſelf at the head of Europe, and uniting the ſeveral princes of it in arms againſt France, been ſo ill adviſed as to make himſelf the head of a German party, and form only petty German connections, and brought the Britiſh force into the internal broils of the Empire : the French Monarch might have inwardly thanked him, but not a power in Europe would have joined him. And had the nation been *then* diſpoſed to raiſe treble the ſums, which his wars really coſt, all our treaſures had been ſpent in vain, and Europe had been enſlaved.

But

But his great mind too well knew the Britiſh intereſt to be miſled by ſuch councils. Inſtead of chuſing to be the head of a German faction, we ſee him actuating the joint councils of Europe, with all the Princes of it attending him to conſult for the general good, againſt the common enemy. There was, I have heard, at the time, a picture made of that great congreſs; but the reader's own imagination will eaſily form one for himſelf, by peruſing the liſt in the margin of thoſe great perſonages, which aſſiſted in it, with the number of troops they reſpectively agreed to raiſe, for the purpoſes of this alliance *.

Such

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* Theſe all aſſiſted at the Congreſs.

The Elector of Brandenburg
Elector of Bavaria
Duke of Lunenburg
Duke of Zell
Duke of Wolfenbuttel
Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel
Prince Chriſtian Louis of Brandenburg
Prince of Waldeck
Prince of Naſſau
Stadtholder of Frieſland
Prince of Naſſau Saarbrug
Governor of Bois le Duc
Prince of Naſſau Dillemburg
Prince of Naſſau Idſtein
Duke Adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg
Two Princes of Anſpach
Landgrave of Heſſe D' Armſtadt
The Prince his brother
Duke of Saxe Eyſenach
Prince Philip Palatine
Duke of Zulſback
Prince of Wirtemberg Newſtadt
Prince of Wirtemberg
The Prince his brother
Duke of Courland
Prince Ferdinand his brother
Prince of Anhalt Zeerborſt
Landgrave of Homburg
Three Princes of Holſten-Beck
Duke of Holſtein
Prince of Commerci
Prince Palatine of Birkenfelt
Count of Horn
Count of Erback
Count Tirimont
Count de Brouay

Such was the auguſt aſſembly which attended him at the Hague. But could we now raiſe him up, to take a view of the ſtate of parties in Europe, how

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Count de Gryal
Count d' Arco
Count de Rivera
Count de Sanfra
Count de Lippe
Count d'Eſpenſe
Count de Fugger
Count de Denhof
Count de Carelſon
Baron of Pallant
Baron of Spaein

The Rhinegrave
His brother
Marquis of Caſhlemonlayo
Marquis of Caſtanago, governor of the Spaniſh Netherlands
General Chauvert
General d'Elwicht
General Barfus
General d'Autel
General Palfi, &c.

The ambaſſadors and foreign miniſters preſent were,

From the Emperor,
Count de Winditſgratz and Berka
Chevalier de Campecht
From the King of Spain,
Don Emanuel de Colonna
From the king of Denmark,
Count of Rebenklam
M. Centhe
From the king of Sweden,
Count of Oxenſtern
From the king of Poland,
M. Moreau
From the elector of Bavaria,
Baron of Broomgarden
M. Prielmeyere
From the elector of Brandenburgh,
M. Vandieſt
M. Smettau

From the elector of Saxony,
M. Haxhauſem
From the elector of Treves,
Baron de Leyon
M. Champagne
From the elector of Mentz,
M. Talberg
M. Meyers
From the elector of Cologne,
General and Baron Beruſaw
M. Soelmaker
From the elector Palatine,
M. Hertermans
From the duke of Savoy,
Count de Pielat
Preſident de la Tour
From the duke of Zell,
M. Zieger
From the biſhop of Munſter,
M. de Nort

From

how would our great Deliverer grieve to ſee the generous labours of his life counteracted and defeated! to ſee Britiſh councils and Britiſh treaſures employed in fomenting quarrels among the princes

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From the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel,
Baron Gortz
M. Reppelaar
From the duke of Wolfembuttle,
Baron Croſek

From the duke of Hanover,
M. Klekk
From the duke of Holſtein Gottorp,
M. Tourken
From the prince of Liege,
Counſellor Mean

Of king William's own ſubjects who attended him to this ſolemnity, were the

Duke of Norfolk
Duke of Ormond
Earl of Devonſhire
Earl of Dorſet
Earl of Eſſex
Earl of Nottingham
Earl of Scarborough
Earl of Selkirk
Biſhop of London
Lord Dramlendrits
Lord Durſley
Earl of Portland
Earl of Monmouth
Duke of Schomberg
His brother count Meinhard, &c. *

The quotas agreed on were as follow;

The Emperor	20,000
K. of Spain in Flanders	20,000
States General	35,000
D. of Savoy, and troops of Milan	20,000
E. of Bavaria	18,000
E. of Saxony	12,000
Landgrave of Heſſe	8,000
Circles of Suabia and Franconia	10,000
D. of Wirtemberg	6,000
E. of Brandenburgh	20,000
Prince of Liege	6,000
Biſhop of Munſter	7,000
E. Palatine	4,000
Prince of Lunenburg	16,000

* Rapin, vol. III. fol. 164.

of

of the Empire, whom it was his great care to reconcile to each other, and unite in the common cauſe! to ſee Britain, inſtead of taking the lead in any grand alliance, humbly ſeconding the ambition of an Elector of Brandenburgh, and offering up an annual tribute, to prevent his deſtroying any more than one proteſtant Electorate! And how would the mighty ſtateſman's ghoſt ſtalk indignant by the man, who, when we were ſunk ſo low in our alliances as a little ſubſidy treaty with a landgrave of Heſſe, and a ſingle elector, ſhould think to raiſe them only in ſound; and attempt to confound a *diminutive*, *defenſive*, *ruinous*, *and impracticable* meaſure with that grand alliance, in which he had fought at the head of Europe, by the help of a pompous equivocal phraſe of continental connections!

I know that it has been ſaid, that England paid all in theſe alliances of king William; and it was flattering the nation's vanity, to ſuppoſe that no country had any money in it but England. The Dutch, however, paid their third part of the ſubſidies in both theſe alliances, and brought three fifths of the troops: but whatever we paid, the object was great and worthy of a true patriot and friend to Europe. But what was it that we did pay? The whole ſum granted that year, 1691, for the land ſervice, was 2,380,698 l. This was to maintain the troops in England and Ireland, and

and ſix thouſand Danes, hired for the recovery of that iſland, and for our part of the grand alliance. The effective pay of theſe land forces, being 69,636 men, amounted to 1,880,698 l. and the remaining five hundred thouſand pounds, as appears by the reſolutions of the preceding and following years, were for the train, general officers, levy-money, tranſports, ſubſidies, hoſpitals in Flanders, and contingencies. The appropriating particular ſums to each particular ſervice, had not then been brought into uſe; but in the diſtribution of this five hundred thouſand pounds among the ſeveral ſervices here enumerated, what proportion of it can be allotted for ſubſidies? Some of theſe articles in the preſent war would ſingly eat up ſuch a ſum. But ſuppoſe the moderation of thoſe times to have left one hundred thouſand pound for ſubſidies: this was all that could be paid among the German princes, who maintained four armies of forty and fifty thouſand men each upon the frontiers of France: and this was in thoſe days repreſented by king William's enemies, and by men of the like principles before the peace of Utrecht, as a ruinous land war: that is, we paid our money to German princes by thouſands, to put all the empire in arms againſt France, and that was a ruinous war. We now ſend it to Germany by millions, without any real allies; nay, a great part of it to be employed in enabling thoſe, who ſhould be our allies, to cut each others throats; and it is right, for this only reaſon, that Britain muſt have its continental connections.

I do not mean to ſay, that theſe ſubſidies did not afterwards grow larger. The reader may ſee the gradual increaſe of them in the hiſtory of the public revenue, with every thing elſe which can be known on this ſubject. I have extracted the German ſubſidies, which we paid in the year 1704, when the Britiſh and Dutch forces marched into Germany, and in conjunction with part of the Imperial army, beat the French, with the ruin of forty thouſand of their beſt troops *.

In the year 1706 †, the ſubſidies to our allies were increaſed; but the whole expence for the land

	l.	s.	d.
* For payment of her majeſty's proportion of the ſubſidies to be paid to her allies for part of her quota of 40,000 men; 21,672 foreigners, 18,328 ſubjects, —	55,272	00	0
To the king of Denmark,	37,500	00	0
To the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel,	11,848	00	0
To the elector of Treves,	5,924	00	0
To the ſtates of Suabia,	31,642	00	0
To the elector Palatine,	712	00	0
To Monſ Moncado, for loſs of waggons and horſes,	8,000	00	0
To the marquis Miremont,	400	00	0
	151,298	00	0

† To the king of Denmark,	37,500	00	0
To the king of Portugal,	150,000	00	0
To the duke of Savoy,	160,000	00	0
To the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel,	5,952	7	6
To the elector of Treves,	5,852	7	6
To the elector Palatine,	4,761	18	6
To the king of Pruſſia,	50,000	00	0
	414,066	13	6

army,

army, including all our ſubſidies, and the pay of our own quota, amounted to no more than 2,814,583 l. 15 s. 9 d. For this our enemies were obliged to maintain an army in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Savoy, Germany, and Flanders; and were oppoſed by equal ones of our allies, in all thoſe ſeveral parts of Europe; with the deſtruction of twenty thouſand French at the battle of Ramillies, and the loſs of a whole army, and half a million of treaſure, at the ſiege and battle of Turin.

I know it has been ſaid, that our allies did not ſupply their ſeveral quotas; but the Dutch proved, that theirs was kept complete; the reſt might be deficient: that is to ſay, inſtead of two hundred thouſand men, our allies ſupplied only a hundred and fifty thouſand; all of which, with our own quota of fifty thouſand men, were brought to fight againſt France, for an expence to England of 2,815,000 l. We have this year ſpent the double of that ſum in Germany alone, and have never had ninety thouſand men for it. Is not the addition of a hundred and fifty thouſand men a better thing than the having none? If our magnanimous ally, to whom we pay a greater ſubſidy than, in the year 1706, we paid to all our allies put together, would now ſend us a hundred and fifty thouſand men to help us againſt the French, ſhould we quarrel with him, and ſay he did nothing, for want of the other fifty?

Britain cannot indeed now complain to its allies, for any failure in their ſeveral contingencies; for our magnanimous ally will tell us, that he is bound to none. Inſtead of forming alliances againſt France with the great powers of the continent, it forms continental connections: that is, it contentedly laviſhes away its treaſures for a ſomething, from which it can draw no troops, called by a fine name, to which it can put no meaning.

Till ſuch great occaſions ſhall return again for Britain to act in conjunction with Holland and Germany, and the other parts of Europe, united in a real alliance againſt France; the true intereſt of England, or of any part of Germany, can never call for our troops upon the continent. We have indeed too long been making ourſelves parties in the internal quarrels of the Empire, to hope ſoon to ſee that and the other ſtates of the continent united in ſuch an alliance: but till then we can have no connection with it. Previous to Britain's having any continental connection, that continent muſt be connected in itſelf. To talk of forming a connection with that, which is itſelf unconnected, is a contradiction in terms. 'Tis adviſing us to catch hold of a looſe heap of duſt; which far from yielding any ſtay to us, can ſerve only to raiſe a cloud to blind our eyes. But when all that continent is connected with France in an alliance againſt us, or the cauſe we would eſpouſe; the ſending our troops thither in ſuch a caſe, and upon ſuch a pretence, is little better than the running our head

againſt

againſt a wall, and ſaying we muſt have a connection with it.

Hard is the fate of Britain, when we ſee men force themſelves into power, by declaiming for twenty years together againſt a particular part of Germany; and then making uſe of that power to ſacrifice three times the ſum in one year, which others had done in the courſe of twenty, to an impracticable defence of it. When we ſee men courting popularity by promiſing, that not a man ſhould go to Germany; and then ſtripping Britain of its troops, to ſend a greater body of its natives to be uſed by a foreigner, than we ever ventured under a general of our own. When we have ſeen men who had declared eternal war with H———r, going contrary to the known intereſt of their country, to their own repeated declarations, and the whole former tenor of their lives; when we ſee no leſs than eighteen millions of the nation's treaſure ſpent in one year, with ſcarce any new troops ſent out for Engliſh conqueſts; when even in theſe circumſtances, we hear of memorials complaining that enough is not done for the German ſervice; we muſt then ſay, that it has been, but never again I hope will be, the misfortune of Britain, and not its intereſt, that it muſt have its continental connections.

The principles already laid down contain, I think, a full anſwer to a plea, which has been often urged for the German war, that it is a diverſion. However, as it has been uſed by great authority, ſome of my readers may think that it requires a particular conſideration. If others do not, they may paſs over

what follows: or at leaſt they will excuſe the writer, if, in the courſe of this anſwer, they ſhould meet with ſome things, which they may think too nearly border on what has been ſaid before. All truths are and muſt be conſiſtent with each other. 'Tis the property of error only to fly out into endleſs lengths, without reſpecting any common point or centre. But every juſt argument muſt have the ſeveral parts of it, like the angles in true meaſuring, all coincide and cloſe in with each other.

The German war then, it is alledged, *has been a diverſion to the French from their naval; and prevented their carrying their operations at ſea, ſo far as they might otherwiſe have done, if that had not engaged their attention.*

If the war in Germany be conſidered as a war of diverſion, I would then premiſe, that the very idea of a war of diverſion, ſuppoſes that Britain makes it a war of choice, and is not brought thither by neceſſity; and if ſo, I have already obſerved, that it is the duty of every wiſe ſtate, in making choice of the province, which it ſhall ſend its troops to act in, to conſider where it can make war to greateſt advantage; where it is itſelf ſtrongeſt, and its enemy weakeſt; where it has itſelf leaſt to loſe, and its enemy moſt; and where its victories are like to have the beſt effect, and ſooneſt bring its enemy to peace.

The preſent war with France began with a conteſt about the foreign ſettlements, and colonies of the two nations. A matter, in which the parliament declared, that the immediate and eſſential intereſts of theſe kingdoms are concerned. Why then

ſhould

ſhould we have deſired to divert any of the courſe of it into a land war in Germany? It could not be, becauſe we found ourſelves the moſt preſſed, and in danger of loſing moſt at ſea; for England is on that element ſuperior to France, and has been in a continual courſe of victory. It could not be becauſe our victories were fruitleſs; becauſe we are gaining thoſe very points which we fought for; and making the moſt valuable acquiſitions, which we could wiſh for. The only acquiſitions, which, when we have taken Martinico, it could be of any advantage to us to gain, and the only ones, which it is practicable for us to keep. Is it then to increaſe the enemy's expence? A ſtate may ſometimes think fit to change the ſcene of a war, becauſe, by carrying it on in one particular manner, they have it in their power, with a few troops, to employ a much greater number of their adverſaries. Thus Britain, by putting 10,000 men on board its fleet, might oblige the French to keep a much greater number on their coaſts. If the length of the north and weſt coaſt of France from Dunkirk to Bayonne be 800 miles, then 10,000 men on board our fleet, require 80,000 men on the French coaſt, for our enemy to find an equal match within an hundred miles to oppoſe them*. But this cannot be the ſort of diverſion intended by the German war.

If we would make a diverſion in Germany, it muſt be by ſending thither more troops than France can, or an equal number, or an inferior number. As to the

* This is what Sir William Monſon ſays in one of his Anſwers to Lord Eſſex's Queries: Armies at land cannot fly, but armies at ſea have wings.

firſt

firſt caſe; if the land force of France be greater than that of Britain, then, in the firſt place, England cannot ſend a greater force to Germany, than France can. In the next place, if it could ſend a greater force thither, it muſt then put itſelf to infinitely greater expence than France; and therefore muſt create thereby a greater diverſion of its own revenues, than of its enemies. And, in the laſt place, if England could ſend to Germany a much greater force than France, the French court, knowing that our army would be ſuperior, would order their own to ſtay at home that ſummer: and in that caſe the diverſion made would be only of Engliſh treaſures, in an argument beyond our natural ſtrength, without a poſſibility of doing our enemy any hurt; while the French money and troops having been kept at home, would be the more ready to attack us in Germany the next year. And we have already ſeen the folly of invading France in that caſe; or of marching into Eaſt Germany.

Let us next ſuppoſe that England ſhould ſend an equal force to France. Where is the advantage in ſuch a diverſion? England puts itſelf to at leaſt as great expence to raiſe and hire freſh troops, as France is at in employing its own ſtanding army to repel it: and if the ſources for a land force are greater in France than in England, then if from two unequal powers you take what equal parts you will, the ſuperior will remain ſuperior, as much as before. But do we really tranſport troops into Germany upon as cheap terms as France can march men over the Rhine or Maeſe, making the country maintain them in their paſſage? Are Engliſh regiments raiſed or ſupported

ported as eaſily as French? Still therefore the diverſion will be againſt us.

But the truth is, all the diverſion, which Britain can make to France in Germany, is by ſending fewer troops at double the expence, to act againſt a greater number of French. Thus it has been every year of the war hitherto, and thus it will continue. I acknowledge that we have happened to have the ſuperior General; but how cruel a hazard is this expoſing our troops to? The ſuperiority of Britiſh valour is a very popular topic, and we are readily diſpoſed to admit the force of every argument to prove that twenty thouſand Engliſhmen can beat thirty thouſand French: but a ſtateſman, who ſhall act upon this principle, will be thought a very ſhallow politician: and if Engliſh ſoldiers are ſo much more valuable than French, he muſt have too little a regard for the lives of his countrymen, who will riſk them upon terms ſo very unequal.

Where ſome great and important intereſt is at ſtake, I hope that no ten thouſand Engliſhmen will refuſe to fight with double the number of French; and much leſs while ſome grand and national object lies in view, refuſe to land on an enemy's coaſt, without having ſeen the half of their own number to oppoſe them. But in Germany where no Engliſh intereſt can be concerned, and no German intereſt if rightly underſtood, the matching twenty-five thouſand Engliſhmen againſt thirty thouſand French, and ſtill worſe, the expoſing them againſt forty thouſand, is by much too expenſive an affair to be choſen upon any account as a French diverſion; and

by

by much too ſerious an affair to be conſidered in any ſenſe as an Engliſh one*.

The German war, therefore, allowing it to be a diverſion, is not an eligible diverſion; becauſe England muſt put itſelf to a greater expence to make it, than it can its enemy to repel it. I now add, that the German war is no diverſion at all. By a diverſion every one knows is meant the turning of a war from one part where we would not have it go, to another part where we have leſs to fear from it. But the bringing the war into Germany is no diverſion at all. It is not a diverſion of the *Forces* of France: it is not a diverſion of the *Treaſures* of France.

As to the former, it may be an employment for the French forces, but is not a diverſion of them. For what one ſervice has the French court to employ their troops in, but in Germany? They may, if they pleaſe, march them down to their coaſt: and there they muſt remain. Have they ſhips to tranſport them, or a fleet to protect them in their paſſage? Though I doubt whether the French troops would ſuffer themſelves to be embarked, now that they have ſeen their men of war deſtroyed, and the

* "It is not ſurprizing (ſays Marſhal Saxe) to ſee ſo many diſeaſes in an army. Thoſe who have the ſtrongeſt conſtitutions perhaps eſcape the longeſt; but they muſt ſubmit to a calamity which is unavoidable——I have always remark'd that a ſingle campaign reduces an army one third at leaſt, and ſometimes one half; and that the cavalry in particular is in ſo wretched a condition by the beginning of October, as to be no longer able to keep the field." Does not this explain the reaſon why our German friends were ſo very deſirous of having Engliſh horſe ſent over to them? They might perhaps think of the expence of horſes: but Britiſh minds ſhould much more grieve to think of ſuch numbers of their countrymen rotting in alternate rains and froſts thro' a winter's campaign.

Britiſh

Britiſh fleet continually upon their coaſt: yet where ſo important a concern is at ſtake, it becomes no man to ſay, that an invaſion is impoſſible; or that the French may not ſome time or other, by ſome very fortunate concurrence of circumſtances, be able to land ten thouſand men upon our coaſts. But then this, I think, we may ſafely ſay, that though for once they might happen to elude the vigilance of our fleet; and by the favour of winds and tides, and long nights, may throw over ten thouſand men for once; yet there will be the chances of a thouſand to one againſt the ſame accidents concurring to enable them to ſend over ten thouſand more in due time to ſupport them. Thirty or forty thouſand men therefore encamped or cantoned upon our ſouth coaſt, makes us abſolutely ſecure; becauſe the firſt ten thouſand would be diſpoſed of long before a ſecond ten thouſand could arrive to ſupport them.

As this reaſoning ſeems juſt in itſelf, ſo we have the evidence of facts to confirm it. Why is it, that the French troops are not now ſtationed upon the coaſts oppoſite to ours, but becauſe both nations ſee the impracticableneſs of bringing them over? The Britiſh councils certainly are convinced of this; elſe why are our national troops ſent out of the kingdom? and we may fairly conclude, that the French court thinks in the ſame manner; elſe what is it which hinders their invading us? Is it the want of troops? That may be a reaſon, why we ſhould

not invade France; but it cannot be a reaſon why a country, which has always two or three hundred thouſand men in its pay, ſhould not invade us. It is not therefore the want of troops, but of the means to bring them over, which prevents the French from invading us. Were their fleet ſuperior to ours, we might then leave Germany as naked as we pleaſed, not a battalion would be ſent thither. All would be brought down upon their coaſt, and a hundred thouſand of them, if they were neceſſary, ſent over to ours. France therefore has not a man the leſs upon its own coaſt for the German war. It does not ſend its army to invade the German dominions from choice, but neceſſity, becauſe they cannot get to England, and have no other ground to meet us on.

If this be not a diverſion of the French forces from England, neither was it any diverſion of them from the defence of their colonies and iſlands. Theſe are too intereſting a concern to the French trade and revenue, to be neglected in their councils: and therefore we have always found the French court ready enough to ſupport them, as long as the leaſt chance remained of their getting their forces over thither. The number of tranſports, with troops and ammunition for their colonies, which we took in the beginning of the war, ſhew this; and the garriſons we found in Cape Breton and Quebec, and the long reſiſtance they have made in America, prove that they were well ſupported. It was not

therefore the want of troops, or their unwillingneſs to ſend them; and much leſs the German war, when the income of the whole Electorate would not be worth to the French nation, if they had an army there, one half of the value of Martinico; but their utter inability to convey them, while their ports were blocked up by the Engliſh fleets; which prevented their ſending over forces every where ſuperior to ours.

If the German war be not a diverſion of the French troops from any other ſervice, neither is it of their treaſures. What the quantity of theſe really is, may not be eaſy to determine; our enemies certainly have ſome millions to ſpare, elſe they need not ſpend them in Germany; which is not their way into England, nor inſtantly to put an end to the war, though it may give them the advantage in the end. But though the ſources of their revenue were the double of what they now are, yet the German war would be a diverſion of them from no other ſervice by which we could be annoyed; becauſe they have no other to employ them in againſt us. Theſe treaſures of France, whenever Britain ſhall, by the enormous waſte of its own, be reduced to aſk a peace, will ſoon grow formidable. Too long have they been trembling for their Eaſt and Weſt-India colonies, as well as their American ſettlements, not to ſee the abſolute neceſſity of a fleet to protect them: and their firſt care after a peace, if we leave them that far the greateſt nurſery of their ſeamen, their ſugar trade, intire,

will, doubtleſs, be to attend to their marine. But while the war continues, it is impoſſible for them to employ their treaſures to that purpoſe. They might poſſibly buy ſhips of Danes, Swedes, or Genoeſe; but to what avail? When that could only put us ſo much the more upon our guard, give our fleet an opportunity of taking one half of them in their paſſage into the French harbours, and oblige the reſt to lie rotting there unmanned, when they had got in? While their ports are all blocked up, and they cannot ſend out a ſingle man of war, but by ſtealth, it is abſolutely impracticable for them to raiſe their navy to an equality with ours. Where are their ſailors to be found? They can only be made by long voyages at ſea; but how can that be done, when they have neither men of war nor merchantmen, which can venture out of their harbours; and the ſugars of their own iſlands are brought home in neutral ſhips? Will they then attempt to form them as Duilius did his rowers at land? Our Britiſh tars would have little to fear from ſuch land-made ſeamen. In ſhort, the preſent war continuing, and the ſtate of parties remaining in Europe, as they now are; no acceſſion of treaſure could make England equal to France at land, nor France equal to England at ſea.

But ſay others, *though it may not be ſo now, yet in the beginning of the quarrel the German war was a ſeaſonable diverſion*; if our enemies had not

ſpent

ſpent their force in Germany, they might then have attended to their marine with more effect, and that might have made them formidable to us. But the very idea of our chuſing the German war as a diverſion, ſuppoſes that we muſt have been there firſt. How early in the war ſoever therefore the French began to ſpend their money in Germany, we began as ſoon, and certainly ſpent as much; and that money employed in our marine, would have carried it to as much greater a height, as the French navy could have been improved by the ſavings of theirs: and if our navy was at firſt ſuperior to theirs, then, if to unequals you add equals, the ſuperiority would ſtill be ours. But in fact, in the beginning of the quarrel, the French court did attend wholly to their marine, and had no German war at all. In the firſt year of the war, therefore, when only ſuch a diverſion could have been of any ſervice to us, we had it not; and by the next year, when their ſailors were ſhut up in our priſons, and their ſhips in their own ports; when Toulon, Breſt, Rochfort, Louiſburgh, and even Cape Francoiſe, were blocked up; when their fiſhery was deſtroyed, their Weſt-India navigation at an end, their ſugars brought home in neutral bottoms, and their breed of ſailors therefore totally ceaſed, from that time we did not want it.

If from reaſoning we recur to facts, and recollect the courſe of the French conduct in the beginning

ning of the war, that will prove the juſtneſs of our reaſoning on this head.

The only proſpect which the French had of invading us with ſucceſs, was, by ſurprizing us in the beginning of the war, before we were prepared for them. Then the nation was juſtly alarmed with the danger of an invaſion, and owed a more grateful return, than it paid him, to the noble lord, who equipped and manned a fleet with ſo incredible a ſpeed, as prevented the enemy, and ſurprized not only all other nations, but even ourſelves: and at the ſame time, with equal foreſight and ſteadineſs, crippled the French marine in the very beginning, and prevented their manning the fleet they had prepared at Breſt and Rochfort to invade us, by ſeizing all their ſhips in their return to Europe, till we had gotten fifteen thouſand of their beſt ſeamen in our power. That was the French ſeaſon for invading us. All their attempts ſince have been the effects of deſperation rather than of council. But during all the year 1756, while the French had any hope left of invading us, they never thought of entering Germany; and ſo far was the Electorate from being in any danger of an attack, that we brought troops from thence over hither. England was then too great an object in the French councils, for them to trifle away their money and troops in Germany. But the next year, when they found themſelves totally fallen from that great hope of ruining us

at

at once, then they took the after-game of trying to do it more gradually; and therefore thought of Germany. And whatever may be now pretended of our having chosen the German war as a diversion, every one must remember, that the army of observation was an army of defence and not of diversion. 'Twas the child of our fears, and our fond concern to keep the French out of the Electorate, and not of any councils of diversion to draw them into it. Then only it was when our enemies found that we had raised a sufficient land force to guard our coast from surprize, and to repel any invasion, that they began to think of sending troops into Germany: and when by the vigilance of our squadrons, at the mouths of their harbours, and the loss of so many of their transports in their passage to their colonies, they found it impracticable to go any where else; then it was that they passed the Rhine, still making every effort, and running every hazard, to succour their colonies. At length they found to their cost that they could not go thither; but they knew that the English forces could, and that they could not be resisted there; that was the part where only they were vulnerable; their best trading interest lay in their islands, which were now naked and exposed; and therefore it was a diversion of the French chusing, and not of the English, to draw the British force into Germany, where they knew themselves to be invulnerable, and were always sure to be superior to us.

I hope

I hope I have in no part of the foregoing ſheets diſcovered any want of duty to our ſovereign, or of humanity for the inhabitants of the Electorate. I would always conſider them as our fellow ſubjects, and our fellow proteſtants ; I wiſh that Hanover could be joined to this iſland, that we might conſider them as our countrymen. But till then, it is for the intereſt of both, that they keep the diſtance which nature has placed them at, and that Britain ſhould know nothing of the Electorate, but as a part of the Empire, if that and the other powers of Europe ſhould ever unite again in an alliance againſt France. Till then for England ſingly, and by its own force, to attempt to defend it, is taking the certain way to bring the French into it, and making that the ſeat of war in every future quarrel. 'Tis giving up all the advantages of our ſituation, and joining our iſland on to the continent, by finding for our enemy a field to beat us in. It is giving up all the benefit of our naval ſuperiority, for the ſake of a diſtant land war, which I have now, I think, ſhewn to be ruinous and impracticable. It is carrying it on in a country, where victory itſelf can do us no good, and where a defeat can do our enemy no hurt. Not to mention that in the preſent caſe, it ſeems to be exhauſting our treaſures to ſupport a Prince, who never can have it in his power, and who is yet to give us the proofs of his having ever had it in his will, to do us any ſervice.

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Providence has been pleaſed to put the whole advantage of the war into our hands; and I fear we are giving it to our enemies. We have it in our power to conquer for Hanover, and ſecure for it ſuch an indemnification, as ſhall effectually deter the French from ever entering it again. We ſeem to be taking the courſe, in which the moſt we can do, is to be ruined for it, and diſabled from ever after defending it. Let any diſcerning man aſk himſelf, what one thing have we done in Germany this year, or the French ſuffered there, to make them want a peace more than the laſt. It is not now the buſineſs of France to exert its whole force, as it did in former wars, with three or four armies in Germany. It is not the intereſt of France to beat us out from thence; that would open our eyes. The French themſelves have found already; and then the people of England would ſoon ſee, that the crown of France can get nothing in Hanover, and Britain can loſe nothing: and the French, if we intreated them, would not ſuffer their army to ſtay there a twelvemonth round. Perhaps it may not be the intereſt of either of the two generals to put an end to the war: it certainly is not the French intereſt; and our foreign general has it not in his power to do it, though his ſucceſs ſhould be five times greater than any he has yet met with. Put his three campaigns into one; (not the expences of them, they will remain a heavy load of debt on our revenue: our millions in Germany, too like to our moments, *pereunt & imputantur*;) but put the victories of his three

campaigns all into one; three ſuch as thoſe of Crevelt, Minden, and Warburgh, all in a ſummer, could have no effect on France towards putting an end to the war. The French court at the worſt could but have their army driven home; and would be as ready the next year to invade the Electorate as the laſt. In ſhort, there has never any reaſon yet been given to convince us, that France may not, with little more than its ordinary revenue, keep on the war in its preſent ſtate for ten years to come. France, while it is itſelf ſuffering nothing, and running its enemy every year ten millions nearer its ruin, will not ſue for peace. Many perſons I know will think it ſtrange to hear of ruin in the midſt of victory and ſucceſs. The Engliſh nation, it will be ſaid, never appeared ſo great as it has the laſt year. But may we not deceive ourſelves by making the vaſt increaſe of our debt the meaſure of our greatneſs? Can our conqueſts be rendered in the leaſt degree more ſecure, for any the greateſt ſucceſſes we can hope for in Germany? The only way to ſecure the preſent, is to go on to make more: not trifling ones on the Miſſiſſippi, but by ſeizing the French iſlands, and holding their whole Weſt-India trade at our diſpoſal; and thereby cutting off the means of their preſent ſupplies, as well as making them willing to ſubmit to any terms to recover a part of their loſſes? * Is there any poſſible way left for the French to ſave or recover their colonies,

* In reſtoring back a part of theſe iſlands, we may be practiſing ourſelves a magnanimity worthy of a great nation, inſtead of being the humble trumpeters of another man's.

but

but only by beating or exhauſting us in Germany? Could they do either, if we would not go thither? Shall we be the better able to defend our conqueſts for our having three years hence fifty millions the leſs in our pockets?

I know it is ſaid that *we have money enough*. I acknowledge that hi herto we have felt no want of it: but ſurely the moſt ſanguine among us will not ſay that an expence of fifteen millions is to be continued fifteen years longer. Should other wiſe and good men think, that we cannot ſupport ſuch an enormous expence beyond another year; yet no one, as a friend of his country, would be fond of giving his reaſons for it. There are others, indeed, who think that the greater debt we incur, the better; becauſe then, ſay they, we ſhall be ſo much the nearer wiping out the whole. The third ſort are not the people with which I ſhall reaſon: I only wiſh that the two former would bethink themſelves in time of the dangers, to which they expoſe the public from them, by running the war into an expence ſo much beyond our abilities.

I am as thankful as any man for the taking of Montreal; but that ſervice has been compleated by the regiments which were there before; the nation therefore has this year been at no expence of tranſports, &c. upon that account. Nor has any expedition which we know of been formed this year, any more than the laſt, againſt the French iſlands. While the only poſſeſſions of value belonging to our

enemies out of France, have lain open to our conqueſts, our men of war have been watching a few run-away ſhips in the Villain for want of other employment; yet with ſcarce any freſh national attempts of conqueſts more than the continuation of thoſe of laſt year, our expences have increaſed. I have hitherto ſpoken of fifteen millions; but will not the real charge of this year 1760 be eighteen millions? And have we not even this ſummer heard of memorials, complaining, that enough is not done for the German ſervice? As the demands for the Britiſh war muſt neceſſarily be reduced; thoſe for the German ſeem to be increaſing.

We are now going to create twelve millions new debt, with an expence poſſibly of twenty: If indeed a Britiſh parliament will concur, to fix in the unbiaſſed mind of our gracious ſovereign, ſo very erroneous a ſtandard of loyalty. Can Gentlemen think of going on thus to load our national induſtry with the intereſt of twelve millions a year; for a ſervice, in which, ſuppoſing our army to be as ſucceſsful as we pleaſe, it will be hard to point out any benefit, even of the ſmalleſt value, which can reſult to Britain? We may talk as we pleaſe of a French bankruptcy; but can any man prove, that our enemies may not go on ſeven years longer? Will any man avow the running his country a hundred millions farther in debt? Dare we imagine that our credit can extend ſo far; or our manufactures and exports, bear the load of ſuch an intereſt? I will

leave

leave the reader to picture to himſelf, what muſt happen long before we have gone ſuch a length. Shall we then, when all the neighbouring nations have been drawing their money out of our hands, and quarrelling with us for the principal; with all the confuſions of bankruptcy; in that general ſtate of diſtruſt, which every individual muſt have of his neighbour; with our ſwords poſſibly aimed at each other's throats; ſhall we then be able to raiſe ten millions within the year to protect the Electorate, or to defend ourſelves?

Some of my readers will recollect upon this occaſion, the hiſtory of one of the firſt of the ancient ſtates; which, tho' under a popular government, was eſteemed the wiſeſt, till that fatal period; when, being engaged in a war at home with their only dangerous rival, which was ſuperior to them at land, but which they triumphed over every year at ſea with a fleet of two hundred ſail; they at length, when their riches and naval power were at their greateſt heighth, and their enemy's coaſt lay all open to them, neglected their own war, to go upon a diſtant land-war, in ſupport of a little remote ſtate, ſcarce heard of before, and made important only by that alliance. We ſhall ſoon, I hope, ſee the miſtake of perſiſting in any ſuch impracticable attempts; and ſhall not give occaſion for poſterity to paſs the ſame judgment upon our German war, as the wiſe Roman did upon the Sicilian: *Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depreſſæque ſunt: in hoc portu Athenienſium nobi-*

nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum, existimatur. Cic. in Ver.

Translation of a Convention between his Majesty and the King of Prussia, concluded and signed at London, the 11*th of April,* 1758.

TRANSLATION.

WHEREAS a treaty between their Britannic and Prussian Majesties was concluded and signed on the 16th day of January 1756, the stipulations whereof tended to the preservation of the general peace of Europe, and of Germany in particular: and whereas since that period France has not only invaded the Empire with numerous armies and attacked their aforesaid Majesties and their allies, but has also excited other powers to act in like manner: and whereas it is so notorious, that the extraordinary efforts made by his Prussian Majesty to defend himself against the number of enemies, who have attacked him on so many sides at once, have occasioned a very great and burdensome expence; whilst, on the other hand, his revenues have been greatly diminished in those parts of his dominions which have been the seat of war; and their Majesties having mutually determined to continue their efforts for their reciprocal defence and security, for the recovery of their possessions, for the protection of their allies, and the preservation of the liberties of the Germanic body; his Britannic Majesty has resolved, in consequence of these considerations, to give an immediate succour, in money,

to

to his Pruſſian Majeſty, as the ſpeedieſt and moſt effectual; and their aforeſaid Majeſties have thought proper, that a convention ſhould be made thereupon, in order to declare and aſcertain their reciprocal intentions in this reſpect; for which purpoſe they have appointed and authorized their reſpective miniſters, viz. In the name and on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, his privy counſellors, Sir Robert Henley, knight, lord keeper of the great ſeal of Great Britain, John earl of Granville, preſident of his council, Thomas Holles duke of Newcaſtle, firſt lord commiſſioner of his treaſury, Robert earl of Holderneſſe, one of his principal ſecretaries of ſtate, Philip earl of Hardwicke, and William Pitt, eſquire, another of his principal ſecretaries of ſtate; and in the name and on the part of his Pruſſian Majeſty, the Sieurs Dodo Henry baron of Knyphauſen, his privy counſellor of embaſſy and miniſter plenipotentiary at the court of his Britannic Majeſty, and Lewis Michell, his *chargé d' affaires* at the ſaid court; who, after having communicated to each other their reſpective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.

I.

His Majeſty the king of Great Britain engages to cauſe to be paid, in the city of London, to the perſon or perſons who ſhall be authorized for that purpoſe by his Majeſty the king of Pruſſia, the ſum of four millions of German crowns, amounting to ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds ſterling; which entire ſum ſhall be paid at once, immediately after

after the exchange of the ratifications, upon the requiſition of his Pruſſian Majeſty.

II.

His Majeſty the king of Pruſſia engages, on his part, to employ the ſaid ſum in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which ſhall act in the moſt advantageous manner for the common cauſe, and for the End propoſed by their aforeſaid Majeſties, of reciprocal defence and mutual ſecurity.

III.

The High contracting Parties moreover engage, viz. On the one part, his Britannic Majeſty, both as King and as Elector; and, on the other part, his Pruſſian Majeſty; not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention or agreement whatſoever, with the powers who have taken part in the preſent war, but in concert, and by mutual conſent, and expreſsly comprehending each other therein.

IV.

This convention ſhall be ratified; and the ratification thereof ſhall be exchanged on both ſides, within the term of ſix weeks, to be reckoned from the date of the ſigning this convention, or ſooner, if poſſible.

In witneſs whereof, We the under-written miniſters of his Majeſty the King of Great Britain, and of his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, by virtue of our full powers, have ſigned this preſent convention, and have ſet the ſeals of our arms thereto.

Done at London, the 11th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1758.

ERRATA.

Page 28. for *or Silesians*, read, *and Silesians.*
77. for *most disadvantageous*, read, *the most.*
111. read, *for of the several.*

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